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I. INTRODUCTION
The development of the Internet as a networked global communications
medium involving many companies along a single transmission route, the
expansion in the range of transactions that occur "on-line," and the
increasing amount of information now stored with third party "Internet
service providers" (ISPs) have produced a qualitative change in the nature
of communication, and accordingly, in the nature and amount of
information that may be exposed to interception by the government. At the
same time, modem electronic communications services that transmit email, and the wide variety of attachments that may accompany them, are
increasingly replacing the U.S. Postal Service as the preferred means of
quick and efficient information delivery.
Formerly, individuals kept information in their homes and file cabinets
where they were protected by a requirement that a warrant first be issued,
based on probable cause, that particularly describes the items sought by the
government. Today, much of that same information is stored in new
locations on the Internet's landscape, where they are protected only by a
requirement that the government obtain a subpoena after a showing of
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specific and articulable facts that there are reasonable grounds to believe
the information is relevant to an investigation. Guidelines issued by the
Department of Justice in January 2001, provide that subpoenas - served
on an ISP and not the customer whose communications will be searched
need not specify particulars of the items to be searched, such as the
author or recipient of the messages sought or the subject matter of the
communications. The subpoena need only note a span of time within
which all such electronic information sent or received in an ISP customer's
account - including personal information not relevant or material to the
investigation - is subject to exposure to the government.
In light of these developments, this Article examines existing statutes
protecting citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures" under the
Fourth Amendment' and the legal standards that have developed since
America's founding to protect the confidentiality of written
communications in the face of demands for government access.
II. MODERN WRITTEN ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

A user's connection to the Internet is made via an ISP. The ISP stands
in a unique position to access information about a person, control and
monitor usage, and disclose this information to others, including law
enforcement.2 As the user's gateway to the Internet, the ISP has complete
1. The Fourth Amendment provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. As stated in a recent White House Working Group Report [hereinafter Report],
Indeed, computers have made it possible for law enforcement agencies to gather

some information that may not have been previously even maintained in the
physical world. For example, an unsophisticated offender, even after 'deleting'
computer files (as opposed to destroying paper records), might leave evidence of
unlawful activity that a trained computer forensic expert could recover. In
addition, because an average computer with several gigabytes of memory can
contain millions of pages of information, a law enforcement agent might, pursuant
to lawful authority (such as a warrant), find volumes of information in one place.
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE OF THE
INTERNET, REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON UNLAWFUL CONDucT ON THE

INTERNET 9 (March 2000), availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.pdf.
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access to any stored data or messages passing through its facility.3 The ISP
may exploit this access within a few legal limits under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).4 Part of an ISP's internal quality
controls may be the copying of messages and information sent by
customers to ensure that a backup of such information is available to
resend in the event a problem is discovered in the delivery of the original
message.5 An ISP's maintenance of a system of backup copies may be
particularly useful when electronic communications are routed through
many different companies responsible for operating different segments of
the larger Internet.6 However, an ISP's customers may be unaware that the
ISP makes copies ofthe electronic communications that pass through their
accounts.
A. Electronic CommunicationsServices Are
Replacing the Postal Service
The benefits of electronic methods of communication are so great that
the Government Accounting Office issued a report in which it concluded
that the U.S. Postal Service
faces growing challenges from competition, notably from . ..
electronic communications alternatives such as the Internet. The
Service projects that such competition will lead to substantial
declines in the Service's First-Class Mail volume in the next
decade.

3.

See A TREATISE ON THE CONsTITUTIoNAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE

LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 306-07

(Thomas M. Cooley ed., 3d.

ed. 1874).

4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2001).
5. See Tom Negrino, Protect Your E-Mail: Keep Your Private Words from PryingEyes,
MACWORLD, July 2000, available at http://www.macworld.con/2000/07/features/email.html
(stating "if you send and receive messages from home, your ISP probably has copies of your e-mail,
because a responsible provider backs up its mail servers regularly."); Bill Machrone, E-Mail
Paranoia, PC MAG., Jan. 17, 2000, available at http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/
comment/0,5859,2414862,00.html (stating "[y]our [e-mail] messages are depressingly easy to find.
Copies are laying about on the sending server, on the receiving server, and in your ISP's backup
files.").
6. See PRESTON GRALLA, How THE INTERNET WORKS: MILLENNIUM EDITION 5 (1999),

availableathttp:llshop.bamesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnnquiry.asp?userid=OGWEDRRKPK
&mscssid=AFK778THXOV59KADBVM1HAXU44NP8UQ9&isbn=0789721325&displayonly =
chapter (stating the Internet "is a collection of thousands of individual networks and organizations,
each of which is run and paid for on its own. Each network cooperates with other networks to direct
Internet traffic so that information can pass among them.").
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The Service and other stakeholders agree that growth in the
Service's core business of delivering First-Class Mail has already
been affected by the rapid growth of the Internet, electronic
communications, and electronic commerce. . . . [T]he Service
projects that First-Class Mail volume will decline at an average
annual rate of 0.8 percent in fiscal years 1999 to 2008. Specifically,
First-Class Mail is projected to grow at an average annual rate of
1.8 percent in fiscal years 1999 to 2002 - the projected peak and then to decline at an average rate of 2.5 percent in fiscal years
2003 to 2008. Such a decline would be unprecedented in the
Service's history.7
The Inspector General of the U.S. Postal Service has also testified before
Congress that "electronic commerce threatens First-Class Mail volumes."'
According to Jupiter Communications, Americans are sending 122
billion e-mails annually, more than half the number of pieces of mail that
the Postal Service handles each year.9 As electronic mail is increasingly
taking the place of traditional postal mail, the privacy values that have
informed analyses of how postal mail should be protected should be
considered in evaluating the standards that appropriately apply to
electronic mail.'0

7. BERNARD L. UNGAR, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, CHALLENGES TO SUSTAINING PERFORMANCE
IMPROVEMENTS REMAIN FORMIDABLE ON THE BRINK OF THE 21 ST CENTURY, GAO/T-GGD-00-2,
at 3 (Oct. 21, 1999), available at http://www.house.gov/reform/postal/hearings/ggd-73840.pdf.
8. Oversight Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Postal Service, House Comm. on
Government Reform, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Karla W. Corcoran, Inspector Gen., U.S.
Postal Serv.), availableat http://www.house.gov/reform/posta/hearings/9.19.00d.pdf.
9. Robert Edmund, PostalReform: Will It Take a Fire?, 17 CATALOG AGE 3, 2000 WL
13296059, at I (Mar. 1, 2000).
10. Congress faces some of the same privacy issues it faced when the telegraph came to
replace the U.S. Postal Service as a preferred means of communication. See Ex parte Brown, 72
Mo. 83, 91 (1880) (involving subpoena of telegram communications:
The facts that railroad train orders are generally communicated by telegraph, that
a vast amount of trade and traffic is transacted through this medium, that it has
become of almost equal importance in the commerce of this country, with the
postal system, and that in a business sense, men are compelled to transmit
communications by the telegraph, are for the consideration of the legislative
branch of the government in determining the propriety of placing telegraphic
communications on the same footing with correspondence by mail).
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B. ElectronicCommerce and CommunicationsServices Have
ContributedSignificantly to the Expansion of the US. Economy
The increased popularity of private electronic communications services
has contributed greatly to the growth of electronic commerce and the
national economy over the past decade. " The dramatic development of the
Internet has transformed methods of gathering, processing and sharing
information. In 1981, fewer than 300 computers were linked to the
Internet.' 2 By 1989, a few years after the ECPA became law, there were
about 90,000 computers linked to the Internet. 3 By June 1996, there were
over 9.4 million host computers worldwide linked to the Internet." A
recent report by a White House Working Group states that:
There can be little doubt that the Internet - a global electronic
network of computer networks (including the World Wide Web)
that connects people and information - has revolutionized and will
continue to revolutionize how we communicate, educate ourselves,
and buy and sell goods and services. The Internet has grown from
65 million users in 1998 to over 100 million users in the U.S. in
1999, or half the country's adult population; the number of Internet
users in the U.S. is projected to reach 177 million by the end of
2003; and the number of Internet users worldwide is estimated to
reach 502 million by 2003. Business-to-business electronic
commerce totaled over $100 billion in 1999 (more than doubling
from 1998) and is expected to grow to over $1 trillion by 2003." 5
A report issued by the Department of Commerce the summer of
1999 summarized the remarkable growth of the Internet economy,
which was spurred by the rapid increase in the number of
consumers with access to computers and the Internet. 6
1I.

See generally DAVID HENRY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EMERGING DIGITAL

ECONOMY II (June 1999).
12. Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Report, supra note 2, at 5.
16. HENRY ET AL., supra note 11, at 2.

While individual private estimates of Internet access and size vary significantly
from each other, taken together they indicate remarkable growth. For example,
The Industry Standard reports that from 1998 to 1999 the number of web users
world-wide increased by 55 percent, the number of Internet hosts rose by 46
percent, the number of web servers increased by 128 percent, and the number of
new web address registrations rose by 137 percent. In addition, according to a
recent study by International Data Corporation (IDC), between 1998 and 1999
revenues of U.S. Internet companies (ISPs) will rise by 41 percent. IDC projects
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The Department of Commerce noted that from 1993-1998, the information
technology industries that make electronic commerce possible including producers of computers and communications hardware,
software, and services - contributed more than one-third of the nation's
real economic growth. 7 Private estimates of 1998 online retail trade
ranged between $7 billion and $15 billion.18 The Commerce Department
concluded in its report that "forecasters now project online retail sales in
the range of $40 billion to $80 billion by 2002.'
III. CURRENT STATUTORY PROTECTIONS OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

Seventy years ago, Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in
Olmstead v. United States,2" predicted that ongoing technological
developments would someday enable law enforcement to search people or
their property without physical trespass.2' He also cautioned that courts
should be alert to these changes in technology in determining the contours
of privacy rights.22
While Internet technology has increased in popularity and will
significantly change the way people handle their affairs, and consequently
the government's handling of personal communications, many statutes
protecting communications privacy were written in an age when postal
mail or the telephone was the dominant means of long-distance
communication.23 These statutes do not cover communications through
that these ISP revenues will continue growing at a compound annual rate of 28
percent through 2003. By any measure, the ability of consumers and businesses
to reach the Internet and to engage in e-commerce is increasing rapidly.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
20. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
21. Id. at 472-77 (stating that tapping of wires leading from defendants' residences to chief
office from which alleged conspiracy was directed did not constitute unlawful search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 472-73. Olmsteadwas overruled in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53
(1967), which held that government's activities in electronically listening to and recording
defendant's words spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth violated the privacy
upon which defendant justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a
search and seizure under Fourth Amendment.
23. As stated in a recent Report,
Regulation tied to a particular technology may quickly become obsolete and
require further amendment. In particular, laws written before the widespread use
of the Internet may be based on assumptions regarding then-current technologies
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increasingly popular means, such as electronic mail and other forms of
electronic communication, leaving them vulnerable to violations of
privacy and consequently tending to deter their use.
A. The Electronic CommunicationsPrivacyAct
Congress initially responded to the emergence of electronic
communication services and the digital era by enacting the ECPA in
1986.24 The federal wiretap statute had been limited to voice
communications. The ECPA extended the wiretap provisions to include
wireless voice communications and electronic communications such as
e-mail or other computer-to-computer transmissions. 25 The ECPA was
intended to reestablish the balance between privacy and law enforcement,
which Congress found had been upset to the detriment of privacy by the
development of communications and computer technology and changes in
the structure of the telecommunication industry.26 Among the
developments noted by Congress were "large-scale electronic mail
operations, cellular and cordless phones, paging devices, miniaturized
transmitters for radio surveillance, and a dazzling array of digitized
networks. 27 Privacy, Congress concluded, was in danger of being
gradually eroded as technology advanced.28
In addition to the goals of privacy and law enforcement, the ECPA
sought to advance the goal of supporting the development and use of these
new technologies and services.29 It was the intent of Congress to encourage
the proliferation of new communication technologies, but it recognized
and thus may need to be clarified or updated to reflect new technological
capabilities or realities.
Report, supra note 2, at 13.
24. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 100 Stat.
1848 (2001) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, 2701-2710, 3121-3126 (2001)).
25. ECPA did not extend all of the federal wiretap protections to electronic communications.
See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,461 (5th Cir. 1994). The
court order authorizing the interception of electronic communications can be based upon suspected
violations of any federal felony, rather than the limited list of crimes that can serve as a predicate
for telephone interceptions. See 18 U.S.C § 2516(3). In addition, no statutory exclusionary rule
applies to non-voice interceptions that violate procedures required by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515
(applying exclusionary rule only to wire or oral communications, not electronic communications).
26. See S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 1.
27. H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18 (1986).
28. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2-3, 5 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 16-19 (1986); see also
H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 18 (stating that "[Ilegal protection against the unreasonable use of newer
surveillance techniques has not kept pace with technology.").
29. See S. REP.No. 99-541, at 5 (1986).
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that consumers would not trust new technologies if the privacy of those
using them was not protected.30
A thorough examination of how the ECPA's rules governing
governmental access to e-mail and other computer communications are
utilized by the federal government is made difficult because there is no
publicly available data on which to base such an assessment. While the
federal wiretap provisions require very detailed reports on interception of
voice communications and interception of e-mail in "real time" transit,3
there is no similar requirement for collecting and publishing information
on the extent of government access to e-mail and other electronic
communications while they are being stored by ISPs following their
transmission.32
B. Government Access to Electronic Information Stored by Third Party
ISPs
In regard to e-mail and other electronic communications, the ECPA has
two purposes. First, the ECPA outlaws most unauthorized private access.3 3
Second, the ECPA provides prerequisites for government access.34
Although the ECPA provides some protection for e-mail and other
forms of "electronic communication" held in "electronic storage," the law
does not provide an "electronic communication" the same level of
protection from government access that is afforded to wire or electronic
communications from interception in transit. 35 Government access to
communications in transit requires an intercept order issued pursuant to
strict requirements.36 However, in order for the government to immediately
30. See id. (noting that legal uncertainty over the privacy status of new forms of
communications "may unnecessarily discourage potential customers from using innovative
communications systems"); H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 19 (1986).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 2519(2) (2001).
32. Requirements regarding law enforcement's "interception" of electronic communications
apply only to real-time monitoring of communications. As most electronic communications are
stored immediately after their transmission, communications recovery of stored electronic
communications is by far the easier and presumably the more common means of government's
accessing electronic communications. The Fifth Circuit has held that Congress did not intend for
the term "intercept" in the Federal Wiretap Act to apply to "electronic communications" when
those communications are in "electronic storage." See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States
Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994).
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2001).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2001).
35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2001).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2001) (requiring for a court order that (a) there is probable
cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
[enumerated] offense ... ; (b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications

2001]
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seize any "electronic communications""' in "electronic storage"38 for 180
days or less requires only an ordinary warrant, and seizure of electronic
communications in storage for more than 180 days39 on an "electronic
communications service,"4 requires only a subpoena or an order issued
pursuant to an offering of "specific and articulable" facts showing
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of an "electronic
communication" are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation is
required, 4 rather than a warrant based on a showing of "probable cause"
requiring that several relatively stringent conditions have been met.42 Thus,
if the same content contained in an e-mail was printed out and stored in a
home file cabinet - or if it were in "electronic storage" for less than 180
days - federal officials would be required to obtain a warrant after a
showing of "probable cause" to retrieve the information.43 Consequently,
if the same information is stored by a third party in electronic form for
more than 180 days - unbeknownst to the deliverer or receiver of the
information - rather than in a home file cabinet, federal officials would
be required to obtain only a subpoena or an order,44 following a less
rigorous showing of need, to retrieve this same information and subject to
a delay in notice to the target for up to 90 days if a court determines that
notification may, among other things, "seriously jeopardize an
concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception; (c) normal investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried
or to be too dangerous; (d)... there is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or
the place where, the wire, oral, or electronic communications are to be intercepted are being used,
or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed
in the name of, or commonly used by such person).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining "electronic communication" as, with certain exceptions,
"any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce").
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (defining "electronic storage" as "(A) any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication"). "[Alny temporary, intermediate storage" describes
an e-mail message that is being held by a third party ISP until it is requested to be read, at which
time an ISP sends the message to the customer's computer. See GRALLA, supra note 6, at 90-91
("When someone sends you an Internet e-mail message, the message usually isn't delivered straight
to your computer. Instead, it gets sent to a mail server.... When you want to read a mail message,
you tell your software to download it [from the mail server] to your computer.").
39. If the communication has been in electronic storage for 180 days or less, the government
must obtain a warrant. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2001).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2001) (defining ECS as "any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications").
41. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), 2703(b)(I)(B)(ii), 2703(d) (2001).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), 2516 (2001).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2001).
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investigation., 45 A warrant is also not required for the government to
obtain the contents of electronic communications in a "remote computing
service ' 4 6 (RCS).
C. Computer Crimes and IntellectualProperty Section of the
Department ofJustice Guidelines State that Copies of Electronic
CommunicationsAre Accessible by the Government Pursuantto a
Subpoena if such CommunicationsHave Already Been Accessed by the
Intended Recipient.
The Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) ofthe
Department of Justice recently issued guidelines for the government's
conduct of electronic surveillance. 47 The CCIPS Guidelines commented on
the Justice Department's understanding of the state of the law regarding
the government's access to electronic communications in "electronic
storage. 4 s
The ECPA defines "electronic storage" as: "(A) any temporary,
intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to
the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of
backup protection of such communication."4' 9 The CCIPS Guidelines state
that "[t]he mismatch between the common sense meaning of 'electronic
storage' and its very particular definition [in the ECPA] has been a source
of considerable confusion. It cannot be overemphasized that 'electronic
storage' refers only to temporary storage, made in the course of
transmission, by a provider of electronic communication service."5
According to the CCIPS Guidelines:
To determine whether a communication is in "electronic storage,"
it helps to identify the communication's final destination. A copy
of a communication is in "electronic storage" only if it is a copy of
a communication created at an intermediate point that is designed
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2001).
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b), 2703(d), 2711(2) (2001) (defining RCS as "the provision to the
public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications
system").
47. See ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIMES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION(CCIPS),
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

INCRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS (Jan. 200 1), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/searchmanual

.htm.
48. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (2001).
50. KERR, supra note 47, at Ill(B).
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to be sent on to its final destination. For example, e-mail that has
been received by a recipient's service provider but has not yet been
accessed by the recipient is in electronic storage.... At that stage,
the copy of the stored communication exists only as a temporary
and intermediate measure, pending the recipient's retrieval of the
communication from the service provider. Once the recipient
accesses and retrieves the e-mail, however, the communication
reaches its final destination. If a recipient then chooses to retain a
copy of the accessed communication on the provider's network, the
copy stored on the network is no longer in "electronic storage"
because the retained copy is no longer in "temporary, intermediate
storage ... incidental to ... electronic transmission." § 2510(17).
Because the process of transmission to the intended recipient has
been completed, the copy is simply a remotely stored file.5
The term RCS is defined by the ECPA as "provision to the public of
computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic
communications system."52 The term ECS means "any wire, radio,
electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the
transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or
related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such
communications."53
According to CCIPS:
Roughly speaking, a [RCS] is provided by an off-site computer that
stores or processes data for a customer. . . . In contrast with a
provider ofECS, a provider of RCS acts in a two-way capacity with
the customer. Files held by a provider of RCS are not on their way
to a third intended destination; instead, they are stored or processed
by the provider for the convenience of the account holder.
Accordingly, files held by a provider acting as an RCS cannot be in
"electronic storage" according to § 2510(17). 54
CCIPS provides the following example to delineate its distinction
between communications held by an ECS and that held by a RCS:
Imagine that Joe sends an e-mail from his account at work
("joe@goodcompany.com") to the personal account of his friend
Jane ("jane@localisp.com"). The e-mail will stream across the
Internet until it reaches the servers of Jane's Internet service
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2001).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2001).
KERR, supra note 47, at Ill(B) (citations omitted).
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provider, here the fictional LocalISP. When the message first
arrives at LocalISP, LocalISP is a provider of ECS with respect to
that message. Before Jane accesses LocalISP and retrieves the
message, Joe's e-mail is in "electronic storage." Once Jane retrieves
Joe's e-mail, she can either delete the message from LocalISP's
server, or else leave the message stored there. If Jane chooses to
store the e-mail with LocalISP, LocalISP is now a provider of RCS
with respect to the e-mail sent by Joe, not a provider of ECS. The
role of LocalISP has changed from a transmitter of Joe's e-mail to
a storage facility for the file on LocalISP's server. Joe's e-mail is
now simply a file stored remotely for Jane by an RCS, in this case
LocalISP."
CCIPS, therefore, understands the current state of the law as allowing
the government access to any copies of an electronic communication
stored with an ISP with a subpoena issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), at
any time after the recipient of the communication has accessed it,
rendering the protections afforded by the warrant requirement for
government access to electronic communications stored by an ISP for 180
days or less applicable only to such communications that have not yet been
read by their intended recipients. 6 CCIPS does not understand 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(17)(B)'s reference to "any storage of an electronic communication
by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection
of such communication" as providing an independent protection for
copies stored with an ISP that may be used for "backup" purposes when,
for example, a misdirected or garbled message may need to be resent.5 7
Rather, CCIPS reads 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) as denying the ECPA's8
protections of copies after the intended recipient of a message accesses it.1
55. Id. (citations omitted).
56. Id. ("It cannot be overemphasized that 'electronic storage' refers only to temporary
storage, made in the course of transmission, by a provider of electronic communication service.").
57. Id.
58. Id.
To determine whether a communication is in "electronic storage," it helps to
identify the communication's final destination. A copy of a communication is in
"electronic storage" only if it is a copy of a communication created at an
intermediate point that is designed to be sent on to its final destination. For

example, e-mail that has been received by a recipient's service provider but has
not yet been accessed by the recipient is in electronic storage. At that stage, the
copy of the stored communication exists only as a temporary and intermediate
measure, pending the recipient's retrieval of the communication from the service
provider. Once the recipient accesses and retrieves the e-mail, however, the
communication reaches its final destination. If a recipient then chooses to retain
a copy of the accessed communication on the provider's network, the copy stored
on the network is no longer in "electronic storage" because the retained copy is no
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This interpretation of the law exposes untold numbers of ISP customer
communications that have been read by their intended recipient to
government access through a subpoena, rather than an order issued under
a probable cause standard.
D. Under the CurrentStatutory Scheme, Citizens Express Much Less
Confidence in the Confidentiality of ElectronicMail Than Regular Mail
CCIPS's interpretation of current law, denying the protection of an
order based on probable cause to communications accessed by their
intended recipients, but which continue to be stored by an ISP, may be
reflected at some level of public understanding. In recent Congressional
testimony by the Postmaster General regarding the relative confidence of
Americans in the confidentiality afforded communications sent through the
U.S. Postal Service rather than through the Internet, the Postmaster
General stated that a recent study by the International Communications
Research group
showed that 66 percent of people believe that mail is the most
private and secure form of communication. Eighty-seven percent
say that it is more secure than e-mail. By a huge majority,
Americans prefer that their confidential documents and personal
messages come through the postal service and not the Internet. It is
not even close. 9
The question arises whether the lack of consumer confidence in the
confidentiality of electronic communications appropriately reflects the
values governing the increased protections traditionally afforded senders
of written communications throughout American history and, if not,
whether the standards for government access to stored electronic

longer in "temporary, intermediate storage ...
incidental to . . . electronic
transmission." Because the process of transmission to the intended recipient has
been completed, the copy is simply a remotely stored file.
(citations omitted).
59. Oversight Hearing Before Subcommittee on the Postal Service, House Comm. on
GovernmentReform, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of William J. Henderson, Postmaster Gen. and
Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Postal Serv.), available at http://new.usps.com/cgi-bin/uspsbv/
scripts/content.jsp?D=24783.
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communications should be raised in order to encourage use of such forms
of communications, further stimulating an economy increasingly fueled by
electronic commerce.6 °
IV. RELEVANT STANDARDS REGARDING THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL
SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT THE CONFIDENTIALITY
OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

As the courts and Congres continue to consider whether or not
existing legal standards protecting stored electronic communications
adequately balance the needs of law enforcement and privacy, a review of
the development of legal standards protecting written communications of
all types, and in effect prior to the development of the Internet, provides
a useful framework for analysis.
A. The OriginalMeaning of the FourthAmendment was Based on the
Prohibitionof GeneralSearches
In a series of recent cases, Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued that
common law doctrine of the era of the Founding Fathers should be
consulted as the starting point for analyzing constitutional search and
seizure issues. 6 ' As Justice Scalia recently wrote,
In determining whether a particular government action violates [the
Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was
regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law
60. As one court stated in quashing an overly broad subpoena issued for telegrams, then a
new and increasingly useful technology,
Such an inquisition, if tolerated, would destroy the usefulness of this most
important and valuable mode of communication by subjecting to exposure the
private affairs of persons intrusting telegraph companies with messages for
transmission, to the prying curiosity of idle gossips, or the malice of malignant
mischief-makers.
Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 95 (1880); see also Inviolability of Telegraphic Correspondence,18
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER 65, 78 (Thomas M. Cooley et al. eds., 1879) (stating production of
telegraphic messages "defeats the policy of the law, which invites free communication, and to the
extent that it may discourage correspondence, it operates as a restraint upon industry and enterprise,
and, what is of equal importance, upon intimate social and family correspondence").
61. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S.
927, 931 (1995); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991).
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when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no
answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional
standards of reasonableness.62
With such advice in mind, it is worth examining the history of the Fourth
Amendment and exploring the particular invasions of privacy it was
intended to prevent.
1. Warrant Requirement Assumed
The chief evil that the Fourth Amendment was intended to address was
the issuance of warrants that were inappropriately general in nature. To
that end, the proscription of "unreasonable searches and seizures" was a
reference to illegally general warrants, and not to an independent standard
governing government searches and seizures, as the common law of the
times required all police officers to obtain warrants before they could act
in any official capacity.63
The constable's arrest authority in the eighteenth century was nowhere
near that enjoyed by police officers today.'M According to Davies,
62. Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1300 (1999) (citations omitted).
63. According to one leading commentator on the history of the Fourth Amendment, Thomas
Davies,
The Founding Fathers "saw no need for a constitutional standard to regulate the
warrantless officer because they did not perceive the warrantless officer as being
capable of posing a significant threat to the security of person or house. That was
so because the ex officio authority of the peace officer was still meager in 1789.
Warrant authority was the potent source of arrest and search authority. As a result,
the Framers expected that warrants would be used. Thus, they believed that the
only threat to the right to be secure came from the possibility that too-loose
warrants might be used."
Thomas Y. Davies, Recoveringthe OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547,552 (1999).
64. The eighteenth century constable could not justify a felony arrest and avoid sanctions by
showing "probable cause," but could usually do so only if there was "felony in fact." James Wilson,
one of the Framers, made the following statement in his law lectures of 1790-91:
It is a general rule, that, at any time, and in any place, every private person is
justified in arresting a traitor or a felon; and, if a treason or a felony has been
committed, he is justified in arresting even an innocent person, upon his
reasonable suspicion that by such person it has been committed.
2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 685 (Robert G. McCloskey ed. 1967) (emphasis added).
See Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316, 319 (Pa. 1814) (stating "[a]nd even when there is only
probable cause of suspicion, a privateperson may without warrant at hisperilmake an arrest. I say
at his peril, for nothing short of proving the felony will justify the arrest"); 2 NATHANIEL DANE, A
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Because only a commissioned judicial officer possessed authority
to administer an oath and act on the basis of another person's
suspicion, crime victims had to make complaints to a local justice
of the peace, the lowest ranking official possessing a judicial
commission. The constable, who had nojudicial commission, could
neither administer an oath nor receive a complaint. Thus, the justice
of the peace served as the gatekeeper who decided whether to
activate the criminal justice apparatus for making arrests and
searches.65
2. The Evils of General Warrants
Warrants, called "Writs of Assistance," authorized officials to "go into
any house, shop, cellar, warehouse or room, or other place, and in case of
resistance, to break open doors, chests, trunks and other packages. 66 In the
late seventeenth century, Sir Matthew Hale condemned general warrants
in his treatise on criminal law because they allowed the party executing the
warrant to act as his own judge.67
According to Davies,
The historical statements about search and seizure focused on
condemning general warrants. . . . Thus, the Framers clearly
understood the warrant standards to be the operative content of the
Fourth Amendment, as well as the earlier state search and seizure
provisions. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the Framers
understood "unreasonable searches and seizures" simply as a
pejorative label for the inherent illegality of any searches or
seizures that might be made under general warrants. In other words,
the Framers did not address warrantless intrusions at all in the
Fourth Amendment or in the earlier state provisions; thus, they
never anticipated that "unreasonable" might be read as a standard
for warrantless intrusions.68
As Davies points out, John Adams introduced the phrase "unreasonable
searches and seizures" when, in 1780, he wrote a provision of the
GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 244, ch. 217, art. 2. (1824) (stating "[blut

'without a fact suspicion is no cause of arrest;' that is, there must be afelony or offence, in fact,
committed, and suspicion is only to the person") (emphasis added).
65. Davies, supra note 63, at 623.
66. 13 and 14 Car. I c. 11 § 5 (1662), 8 PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE 81 (1763).
67. See 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 150 (Sollom Emlyn
ed. 1736).
68. Davies, supra note 63, at 551.
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Massachusetts Constitution that most closely anticipated the Fourth
Amendment. 69 Adams' use of the phrase reveals that "unreasonable" was
derived from Sir Edward Coke's earlier use of "against reason" as a
synonym for inherent illegality. Therefore, "unreasonable searches and
seizures" was a label denoting the inherent illegality of general warrants.7'
Davies also notes that James Madison, who proposed the draft that
ultimately became the Fourth Amendment, viewed his proposal only as a
ban against "general warrants." According to Davies,
Although Madison's draft was modified by the House of
Representatives to produce the final two-clause text of the Fourth
Amendment.

.

.

.

[T]here is no historical support for the

conventional claim that this change was made to provide a
reasonableness standard to regulate warrantless intrusions. Rather,
the evident purpose for the change - which inserted the words
"and no warrants shall issue but.. ." - was simply to make the ban

69. Id.at 554. Article XIV of the Massachusetts Constitution states:
Every subject has arightto be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures,
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants,
therefore, are contrary to this right, ifthe cause or foundation of them be not
previously supportedby oath or affirmation; and ifthe orderin the warrant to a
civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected
persons, or to seize their property, be not accompaniedwith a specialdesignation
of the persons or objects of search, arrest,or seizure: and no warrant ought to be
issued but in cases, and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.
MAss. CONST. part I, art. XIV (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 554-55. Davies elaborates,
In 1610, Coke had asserted in Dr. Bonham's Case that a statute was
unconstitutional and void if it was "against common right and reason" - that is,
if it violated basic principles of the common law. Adams's mentor, James Otis,
invoked Coke's dictum when he condemned British legislative authority for
general writs of assistance as being "against reason" in the 1761 Writs of
Assistance Case-the initial American controversy over general warrants. Adams
took notes of Otis's argument.... Adams would also have been aware of similar
invocations of Coke's "against reason" - often converted to "unreasonable" in other legal and political writings of the time. Thus, Adams understood
"unreasonable" to mean inherently illegal or unconstitutional, and he used
"unreasonable searches and seizures" as the perfect pejorative label for a search
or seizure under a general warrant - a search or seizure that would have been so
violative of the law of the land that it could not have been authorized even by
legislation.
Davies, supra note 63, at 555 n.5 (citations omitted).
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against any authorization of general warrants more explicitly
imperative than Madison's language had made it.7
This history has been noted in several U.S. Supreme Court opinions,72
along with an aversion to the "indiscriminate rummaging" that occurs
under inappropriately general warrants.73
In Stanfordv. Texas,74 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed
a four hour search in which the government seized fourteen boxes of
materials, including books in the defendant's house, along with "many of
[his] private documents and papers, including his marriage certificate, his
71. Id. at 555. Davies poses the question as to why the Framers bothered to "adopt
constitutional bans against general warrants in light of the apparent consensus that the general
warrant was illegal at common law." Id. at 657. He responds that legislation posed the only
plausible threat that general warrants might be made legal following the adoption of the U.S.
at 658. Davies writes, "[I]ndeed, Parliament had reauthorized the general writ
Constitution. See id.
of assistance in the Townshend Act of 1767 ...Thus, the Framers' constitutional concern was
preventing the legislature [Congress] from authorizing use of general warrants." Id. at 657-58.
Madison's concern that congressional power might be limited through a bill of rights was expressed
in a speech to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, stating,
In our government it is [necessary to guard against abuse by] the legislative
[branch], for it is the most powerful, and most likely to be abused, because it is
under the least control. Hence, so far as a declaration of rights can tend to prevent
the exercise of undue power, it cannot be doubted but such declaration is proper.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 454 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
72. See Boyd v. United States, 6 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)
The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing writs of assistance to the
revenue officers, empowering them, in their discretion, to search suspected places
for smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced "the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law book;" since they placed
"the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures conducted
under the authority of 'general warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and
adoption of the Fourth Amendment.").
73. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927):
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized
makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one
thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left
to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the Fourth Amendment does not permit "a
general, exploratory rummaging," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971), or
"indiscriminate rummaging," Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 62 (1974).
74. 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
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insurance policies, his household bills and receipts, and files of his
personal correspondence. 75 None of the documents seized included the
Communist Party records mentioned in the warrant application. 76 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that the warrant ordering the search for various
written instruments concerning the state Communist Party and its
operations was an unconstitutional general warrant violating the
constitutional requirement that warrants particularly describe the things to
be seized. The U.S. Supreme Court stated,
We need not decide in the present case whether the description of
the things to be seized would have been too generalized to pass
constitutional muster, had the things been weapons, narcotics, or
cases of whiskey .... The point is that it was not any contraband of
that kind which was ordered to be seized, but literary material "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Party of Texas, and the operations of the Communist
Party in Texas." The indiscriminate sweep of that language is
constitutionally intolerable. To hold otherwise would be false to the
terms of the Fourth Amendment, false to its meaning, and false to
its history.77
Similarly, in Kremen v. UnitedStates,78 federal agents seized the entire
contents of a cabin and took them to an office two hundred miles away. Of
the items seized, "only a fragmentary part" was ever introduced into
evidence.79 SilverthorneLumber Co. v. United States,0 involved "a clean
sweep of all the books, papers and documents found" in the defendant's
offices, which the U.S. Supreme Court characterized as an "outrage. '"81
Courts have also held that greater care in description is particularly
important when the type of things sought in a warrant is generally in
lawful use, and used in large quantities.82 The reasonableness of the search
75. Id. at 480.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 486 (citations omitted).
78. 353 U.S. 341-48 (1957) (holding that where federal agents, after keeping cabin under
surveillance for 24 hours, arrested one defendant outside cabin under warrant and arrested two other
defendants inside cabin without benefit of warrant, and thereafter agents made exhaustive search
of cabin and seized its entire contents although they possessed no search warrant, seizure of entire
contents of cabin was invalid, and introduction of such evidence against persons arrested rendered
verdicts illegal).
79. Id. at 348.
80. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
81. Id. at 390-91.
82. See Namen v. State, 665 P.2d 557, 563 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (stating warrant for stolen
jewelry was insufficient, as "jewelry is commonly found in homes"); In re Search Warrant of
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will also often depend in part on the nature of the place to be searched. 3
A more particular description may also be required when other objects of
the same general classification are likely to be found at the particular place
to be searched. 4 A more general description of things to be searched is
appropriate only where there is a significant reason to believe all such
things described are involved in a crime. 5
Search warrants for documents are also generally deserving of
somewhat closer scrutiny with respect to the particularity requirement
because of the potential they carry for a very serious intrusion into
As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Andresen v.
personal privacy.
86
Maryland,

We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers that
are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for
physical objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In
searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents
will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether
they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. ....
[During the course of such] searches, responsible officials,
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are
conducted in a manner thafminimizes unwarranted intrusions upon
privacy. 7

Property in a 1969 Plymouth Roadrunner, 455 S.W.2d 466, 471 (Mo. 1970) (stating description of
"stereo tapes or players" was insufficient); People v. Prall, 145 N.E. 610, 612 (I1. 1924) (stating
description of "certain automobile tires and tubes" was insufficient).
83. See United States v. Caves, 890 F.2d 87, 93 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding warrant for car
to search for documents indicating possession of controlled substance, because "the object of the
search was to discover contraband hidden in the secret compartment of an automobile, not to sift
through mounds of personal papers as would be involved in an IRS investigation of an individual").
84. See United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987) (warrants to search
wholesale distributor, warehouse, and retail clothing store for "cartons of women's clothing" had
insufficient description in absence of explanation how executing agents could differentiate stolen
clothing from other goods at those locations); United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 732 (5th Cir.
1981) (stating "cassettes onto which... copyrighted films... have been electronically transferred"
were insufficient as to place with many other cassettes); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 418 N.E.2d
1226, 1228-29 (Mass. 1981) (stating warrant for"antiquejewelry" in jewelry store was insufficient
where "there was no reason to believe that the stolen jewelry would be a significant portion of the
Taylor's Jewelers inventory").
85. See United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1509 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating warrant for
premises of credit card fraud defendant, description of "any credit cards" was sufficient, as "the
circumstances of this case make it highly unlikely that any credit cards found in the rooms would
be legitimately possessed"); United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1982).
86. 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.1 1(1976).
87. Id. at 482.
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Descriptions so sweeping as to authorize a general, exploratory search
have been condemned, as where the warrant authorizes a search for any
papers containing the names and addresses of the defendant's associates."8
B. "ReasonableExpectation of Privacy" Standard
Despite the intent of the Founding Fathers that the Fourth Amendment
simply ban general warrants, modem U.S. Supreme Court precedents have
subsumed most analysis of searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment under the standard that they be allowed unless found to be
"unreasonable" following an examination of all the surrounding
circumstances.

88. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1115-16 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating warrant for
records "containing initials, names, addresses, dollar amounts, codes, figures, and the like" was
insufficient where warrant does not even make reference to a type of criminal activity); United
States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating warrant for articles "tending to
establish the wealth and financial status" of defendant and for "evidence of association of [Ralph
Washington] with the following persons, but not limited to them" was "patently overbroad")
(emphasis added); Griffin v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 379,388-94 (5th Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
People v. Frank, 700 P.2d 415, 419-21 (Cal. 1985) (stating warrant for any "documentary evidence
tending to show the whereabouts" of child on specified dates was too broad and "it would
inevitably be necessary for the police to rummage through all defendant's personal papers and read
enough of each to learn its contents"). The same is true where warrants describe any "property
tending to establish the identify [sic] of persons in control... of the premises." State v. Kealoha,
613 P.2d 645, 647, 651 (Haw. 1980) (citations omitted) (stating this language "too closely
resembles the wording of a forbidden 'general warrant' and invites a strong intrusion into private
papers and other personal effects). A warrant for "[a]ny and all other records and paraphernalia
connected with" a corporate defendant's business would also be overbroad. Aday v. Superior Court,
362 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1961); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(stating general description insufficient, as affidavit "related only very particular information
implicating appellant in a specific scheme to defraud and made no assertions concerning the nature
or extent of appellant's business dealings as a whole"); United States v. Stubbs, 873 F.2d 210, 211
(9th Cir. 1989) (stating warrant for all records of real estate office invalid, as "affidavit fails to
provide probable cause for a reasonable belief that tax evasion permeated Stubbs' entire real estate
business"); Klitzman, Klitzman & Gallagher v. Krut, 744 F.2d 955, 957-58 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating
war/rant for law office authorizing seizure of files of all personal injury claimants and related
documents, resulting in seizure of over 2,000 files, was too broad); In re Grand Jury Proceedings;
Young, 716 F.2d 493,497 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating warrant for all bail bond records over seven-year
period invalid because excessive and unreasonable).
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1. Move from Objections to General Warrants to Objections to
Unreasonable Searches
The jurisprudential move toward a general "unreasonableness"
standard in evaluating searches and seizures can be seen largely as a
judicial response to the evolving powers of police officers, who came to
have official authority to act without a warrant. As Davies explains,
During the early nineteenth century, the turn to legislative codes
undermined the notion of a permanent common law, thereby
blurring the common-law foundation for the Bill of Rights ....
New
concerns about crime and social disorder during the nineteenth
century gave rise to a perception that the common-law structure of
law enforcement was inadequate to meet the needs of an
increasingly complex and urban society Contemporaneously with
the advent of police departments and career officers, courts and
legislatures drastically expanded the ex officio authority of the
warrantless officer.89
2. Formulation of the "Unreasonableness" Standard
in Katz v. United States
In 1967, in the landmark cases of Berger v. New York' ° and Katz v.
UnitedStates,9 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that electronic surveillance
was a search and seizure covered by the privacy protections of the Fourth
Amendment.92 Justice Harlan first coined the phrase "reasonable
89. Davies, supra note 63, at 725 (stating in n.507, "For a discussion of the codification
movement circa 1820-40," see KERMT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY
126-27 (1989)).
90. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
91. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. Unlike searches conducted pursuant to a traditional search warrant, which authorizes only
one intrusion, newly emerging electronic surveillance involved an ongoing monitoring process. See
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57, 59 (1967). Officers must execute a traditional search warrant
with dispatch, not over a sustained period of time. See id. at 57. If they do not find what they were
looking for in a home or office, they must leave and obtain a separate order before returning to
search again. See id. Electronic surveillance, in contrast, may occur continuously for days or
months. See id. at 59. The usefulness of electronic surveillance also depends on lack of notice to
the suspect. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In the
execution of the traditional search warrant, an announcement of authority and purpose - so-called
"knock and announce" - is considered important because the person whose privacy is being
invaded can then observe any violation in the scope or conduct of the search and immediately seek
a judicial order to halt or remedy any violations. See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394
(1997). The U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the centrality of knock and announce to the
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expectation of privacy" as something the Fourth Amendment protected in
his concurring opinion in Katz,93 and the Court adopted this phrase in
subsequent cases. 94
Responding to the U.S. Supreme Court's Berger and Katz opinions and
to the arguments of law enforcement that wiretapping was a vital tool to
combat organized crime, Congress, in 1968, authorized law enforcement
wiretapping under a system of protections intended to temper the uniquely
intrusive aspects of electronic surveillance." According to the Senate
report, the legislation had multiple purposes, including (1) "to protect the
privacy of wire and oral communications" and (2) "to define on a uniform
basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of
wire and oral communications may be authorized." 96 In brief, the
legislation Congress enacted in 1968 had the following components: the
contents of wire communications could be seized by the government in
criminal cases pursuant to a court order issued upon a finding of probable
cause; 97 wiretapping would otherwise be illegal; 9 wiretapping would be
permitted only for specified crimes; 99 it would be authorized only as a last
resort;"°° surveillance would be carried out in such a way as to "minimize"
the interception of innocent conversations;... notice would be provided
after the investigation had been concluded;"0 2 and there would be an
opportunity prior to introduction of the evidence at any trial for an
adversarial challenge to both the adequacy of the probable cause and the
conduct of the wiretap.103

Fourth Amendment's protective scheme. See id. In contrast, electronic surveillance is conducted
surreptitiously. See Lopez, 373 U.S. at 463.
93. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart
did not use the phrase in his majority opinion. Id. at 353. Instead, his language focused on whether
the petitioner had a privacy interest on which he could "justifiably rel[y]." Id.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973); Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9
(1968). See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (stating "legitimate expectation
of privacy"); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971) (stating justifiable expectation
of privacy).
95. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III.
§ 801, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
96. S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (2001).
98. 18U.S.C. §2511 (2001).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2001).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (2001).

101. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2001).
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (2001).
103. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9)-(10) (2001).
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3. Limits to the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Standard
Early in this century, the U.S. Supreme Court warned that courts "must
be vigilant to scrutinize the attendant facts [surrounding a search] with an
eye to detect and a hand to prevent violations of the Constitution by
circuitous and indirect methods.""
The reasonable expectation of privacy test could only be used to
measure "untainted" expectations most confidently once, namely at its
inception and prior to the introduction of any new policies, practices, or
statutory requirements that would later shape citizens' expectations. The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized this in footnote 5 of its decision in Smith
v. Maryland,"5 in which it stated:
Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz's two-pronged
inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment
protection. For example, if the Government were suddenly to
announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would
be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in
fact entertain any actual expectation or privacy regarding their
homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a
totalitarian country, unaware ofthis Nation's traditions, erroneously
assumed that police were continuously monitoring his telephone
conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the
contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such
circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations had
been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth
Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously
could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a
normative inquiry would be proper." 6
The U.S. Supreme Court also recognized other values as informing
legitimate interpretations of the Fourth Amendment in footnote 12 of
Rakas v. Illinois,10 7 in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
Obviously... a "legitimate" expectation of privacy by definition
means more than a subjective expectation of not being discovered.
A burglar plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season
104.
105.
106.
107.

Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 32 (1927).
442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979).
Id.
439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
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may have a thoroughly justified subjective expectation of privacy,
but it is not one which the law recognizes as "legitimate."... And
it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion
that those expectations of privacy which are legitimate depend
primarily on cases deciding exclusionary-rule issues in criminal
cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society.'
4. Effects of Involvement of Third Parties on the "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy"
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in G.M Leasing Corp. v. United
States,'O9 the proposition that business premises are not protected by the
Fourth Amendment "could not be defended in light of this Court's clear
holdings to the contrary.... Nor can it be claimed that corporations are
without some Fourth Amendment rights.""'
(i) Legal Protections of Telegraph Communications
The involvement of private businesses in electronic communications
can be traced back at least to the introduction of the telegraph; therefore,
an exploration of how courts and legislatures addressed privacy concerns
surrounding government access to the content of telegrams" provides an
insight into how courts originally addressed many of the same issues they
108. Id. at 143 n.12. Property rights, however, cannot exclusively delineate the contours of a
reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, an ISP's ownership of the transmission lines of an
electronic communication would not in itself deny its customers a reasonable expectations of
privacy in such communications. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) ("[Clapacity
to claim the protection of the [Fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded
place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion.").
109. 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
110. Id.at 353 (citations omitted).
I11. See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892,
1901-02, n.68, n.72 (1981) (stating "[t]he telegraph posed additional problems of privacy
protection" for companies) (citing Western Union Telegraph Co., Rules, Regulations, and
Instructions no. 128, at 55 (Cleveland 1866; Exec. Order No. 147(1873), reprinted in5 CONG. REC.
153 (1877)). "All managers and other employees are strictly prohibited from furnishing copies of
original messages or from certifying to the correctness of any message, or copy thereof, whether
sent or received." 5 CONG. REC. 153 (1877) (reprinting Western Union Telegraph Co., general
rules).
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struggle with today regarding government access to communications
transmitted and stored on privately managed ISP networks. As one
commentator has described,
The telegraph posed problems of privacy protection because
messages were necessarily read by the operators who sent and
received them .... Disclosure by employees, including operators
and those with access to messages retained in office files, was
prohibited by company rules and by statute in nearly every state." 2
It was much debated as to "[w]hether such statutes also prevented
government investigators from demanding the production of telegrams."" 3
For example, "Western Union firmly opposed and resisted legislative as
well as judicial subpoenas," and "in 1873, Western Union ordered
employees not to comply with subpoenas for telegraph messages in the
company's possession.14 Further,
Newspapers characterized congressional dragnet subpoenas of
telegraph office files as "unconstitutional and indecent." Debate
over the privacy of telegraph communications reached its height in
1876,

when opponents of the subpoenas in Congress invoked the "rights
of private citizens".., to "intrust their most sacredly private affairs
to the telegraph compan[y] under the seal of its confidence," against
"the invasion of their privacy by their servants, the House of
Representatives."' 5

112. The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth CenturyAmerica, supra note 111, at 1901 (citations
omitted).
113. Id. "As an emergency war measure in 1861, President Lincoln's War Office seized files
of telegrams in all the major cities.... After the war, the Reconstruction Congress issued broad
subpoenas of telegraph company files as part of its investigative activities." Id. at n.71 (citations
omitted).
114. Id. at 1901 n.72 (citations omitted).
115. Id.at 1901 nn.73-74 (some citations omitted) (citing Washington - Secrets of the
Telegraph, N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1876, at 4; Glover's Raid for Telegrams, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Dec. 20,
1876, at 1). "The unconstitutional and indecent use which the Committed of the Real Estate Pool
is making of about three quarters of a ton of telegrams sent by the Atlantic and Pacific Telegraph
Company is attracting renewed attention and indignation." Washington-Secrets of the Telegraph,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 1876, at 4.
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Judge Cooley argued for judicial recognition of the absolute
"inviolability" of telegraphic correspondence," 6 and he advocated that
telegrams should enjoy the same protections afforded mail
communications. In his constitutional treatise, Judge Cooley harshly
commented on a case decided by the Supreme Court of Maine, which
upheld the forced disclosure of telegrams, stating:
The case is treated as if no other considerations were involved than
those which arise in the ordinary case of a voluntary disclosure by
one private person to another without necessity. Such, however, is
not the nature of the communication made to the operator of the
telegraph. That instrument is used as a means of correspondence
and as a valuable and, in many cases, an indispensable substitute for
the postal facilities, and the communication is made, not because
the party desires to put the operator in possession of facts, but
because transmission without it is impossible. It is not voluntary in
any other sense than this, that the party makes it rather than deprive
himself of the benefit of this great invention and improvement. The
reasons of a public nature for maintaining the secrecy of telegraphic
communication are the same with those which protect
correspondence by mail; and, though the operator is not a public
officer, that circumstance appears to us immaterial. He fulfills an
important public function, and the propriety of his preserving
inviolable secrecy in regard to communications is so obvious that
it is common to provide statutory penalties for disclosures."'
At the time, "Western Union pressed for specific legislation affording
telegrams the same protection as letters in the mail. Ultimately the issue
was settled by the courts, which required that subpoenas specify the date
and subject matter of the particular telegrams sought."''I

116. Id.
117. A TREATISE

ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE

POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 306-07 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 3d. ed. 1874).

118. See Note, supra note 11, at 1901 (citing United States v. Hunter, 15 F. 712, 714-15
(N.D. Miss. 1882) (granting motion to set aside subpoena because subpoena did not specify subject
matter or identities of recipients of telegrams sought); Exparte Jaynes, 70 Cal. 638, 639, 12 P. 117,

117(1886).
The petitioner was served with subpoena duces tecum, requiring him to produce
telegraphic messages, but there was nothing to point his attention to any particular
message or messages; he was required to search for and produce all messages
from a number of persons to many other persons between certain specified dates.
The service of the subpoena was an evident search after testimony. The petitioner
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By 1894, one court described the legal status quo as follows: "The
present legal status of the telegram, as judicially determined . . .is
substantially as follows. . . [T]he same rule which governs search
warrants in general [regarding the requirement of specificity] should
govern in the case of telegraphic messages."" 9
An important test of these legal precedents regarding the appropriate
protections to be afforded telegrams came in 1936, when the Senate
Special Committee To Investigate Lobbying Activities issued subpoenas
20
duces tecum to telegraph companies doing business in Washington, D.C. 1
The subpoenas demanded the delivery of all telegrams and copies of
telegrams sent during 1935 that might concern a measure then pending in
Congress, the Wheeler-Rayburn Bill.' 2 ' When the companies refused to
deliver the telegrams, the Committee sought the assistance of the Federal
Communications Commission, which had statutory authority to inspect
and examine all accounts, records, memoranda, documents, papers, and
correspondence of communication carriers. 122Working in conjunction with

was not bound to respond, and committed no contempt in failing to examine the
papers under his control, to ascertain if any such messages had been sent or
received.
Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 94-95 (1880) (holding that subpoena seeking all messages sent or
received by named individuals within a period of fifteen months is insufficiently narrow)
To permit an indiscriminate search among all the papers in one's possession for
no particular paper, but some paper, which may throw some light on some issue
involved in the trial of some cause pending, would lead to consequences that can
be contemplated only with horror, and such a process is not to be tolerated among
a free people .... Here, communications, at different times within a period of
fifteen months, sent or received by the parties named, are called for. The date,
title, substance, or subject matter of none of them is given, and it is utterly
impossible that it could have been made to appear, without more, that any of the
messages were material as evidence before the grand jury. Moreover, it not only
called for all messages between the parties named, but for all which may have
been sent or received by either of the parties, to or from, any person on the face
of the earth.... Matters which it deeply concerned the parties to keep secret from
the world, and of no importance or value as evidence in any cause, might thus be
disclosed to the annoyance and shame of the only persons interested.... It is no
answer to this that the obligation of secrecy imposed by law on grand juries would
prevent such exposure.
119. In re Storror,63 F. 564,567 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (quoting "Henry Hitchock in the Southern
Law Review (vol. 5, N.S. 473)").
120. See 80 CONG. REC. 4089 (1936).
121. See S.1725,74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935); 79th CONG. REc. 1513 (1935); H.R. 5423,74th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); 79th CONG REC. 1624 (1935).
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 215(a) (2001).
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a Commission member, the Committee made copies of or notes on
thousands of telegrams. Debates in both houses of Congress explored the
constitutionality of these actions.'
In Hearstv. Black, 24 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit described the subpoenas as "blanket subpoenas duces tecum [that]
demanded of the telegraph companies doing business in the City of
Washington the delivery to it (the committee) of all communications i.e., telegraph messages - transmitted through the offices of such
companies during the period February 1, 1935, to September 1, 1935.' ' 2
The circuit court noted
that among the telegrams examined and copied were messages from
appellant to his associates and employees and messages from his
associates and employees to him which had no connection with the
subject matter of the investigation - all of which were sent in the
regular and
orderly conduct of the business in which appellant was
126
engaged.

The circuit court held that "we are of opinion that the resolution adopted
by the commission, under which its agents took possession of the telegraph
companies' offices and examined wholesale the thousands of private
telegraph messages received and dispatched therefrom over a period of
seven months ..

. was without authority of law."'

2

The circuit court

explained that
the property right in private telegrams is in no material respect
different from the property right in letters and other writings; nor is
there any good reason why the right of privacy in the one should be
any greater than in the other. Telegraph messages do not lose their
privacy and become public property when the sender
communicates
2
them confidentially to the telegraph company. 1

123. See 80 CONG. REC. 3265-67, 3285, 3427-37, 3578-80, 3886-87, 4088-4106, 4384-85,
4495-99, 4649-53, 4697-4709, 6158-59 (1936).
124. 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
125. Id. at 68.
126. Id. at69.
127. Id. at 70.
128. Id. The Court also noted "an almost universal recognition of the fact that the exposure
of family confidences and business and official secrets would as to telegrams equally with letters,
be 'subversive of all the comforts of society"' and that "if a Senate Committee were to attempt to
force a telegraph company to produce telegrams not pertinent to the matters the committee was
created to investigate, the company could be restrained at the instance of the sender of the
telegrams." Id. at 70-71.
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(ii) Physical Characteristics Cases Focus on What Employees Must
Necessarily View to Fulfill a Delivery Function
Today, limited exposure of communication materials to employees of
communications service providers during the course of monitoring
reasonably necessary to the efficient provision of such services should not
deny such materials the protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Cases regarding reasonable detention of mail for examination have
relied on the presence of obvious exterior features readily visible to postal
service employees. 29 Similarl), persons are assumed to understand that
writing on the outside of a piece of mail must necessarily be viewed by
those charged with delivering it. 3 The same reasoning is present in the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Miller, 3 ' in which the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a bank customer has no legitimate
"expectation of privacy" in the contents of his original checks and deposit
stubs because they "contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the
banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business." ' 32
129. See United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding investigatory
detention of express mail package addressed to defendant's post office box until search warrant
could be obtained was justified where package was unusual in that it smelled of coffee, which can
be used to mask smell of drugs, and cost $9.95 to ship yet was relatively light, postal inspector
learned that designated sender of package did not live at listed return address and that residents
there had not mailed express mail package to Utah, handwriting analysis revealed that several
receipts for prior packages shipped to box showed labels written by one person using different
names and addresses, and inspectors expeditiously applied for warrant). Indeed, a package
generally must meet several of the "drug package profile" criteria before it can be searched without
a warrant. See United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1382, 1380 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that
detention of "Express Mail" package did not amount to unreasonable seizure within meaning of
Fourth Amendment, where package met three out of seven characteristics of the U.S. Postal
Service's "drug package profile") (describing the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's drug package
profile as including "(I) size and shape of the package; (2) [whether] the package [isI taped to close
or seal all openings; (3) handwritten or printed labels; (4) unusual return name and address; (5)
unusual odors coming from the package; (6) fictitious return address; and (7) destination of the
package").
130. See Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 348 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding constitutionality
of government examination of the outside of mail envelopes without a warrant because "[tihe
persons who sent or received mail knew or ought to have known that postal employees must
examine the outside of the mail in order to deliver it."); United States v. Huie, 593 F.2d 14, 15 (5th
Cir. 1979) ("There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in information placed on the exterior of
mailed items and open to view and specifically intended to be viewed by others.") (emphasis
added); United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 175 (9th Cir. 1978) (no constitutional violation
where "the information in question was voluntarily conveyed to the Postal System and exposed to
its employees and others in the ordinary course of passage of letters and packages from the senders
to the defendant").
131. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
132. Id. at 442. The U.S. Supreme Court added,
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E-mail and electronic communications content is generally not exposed
to electronic communications service employees. While the exterior of
letter mail must be read by an employee, an e-mail sent automatically and
electronically need not be, and the content of such communications are
generally not exposed to employees unless required for maintenance
purposes.' 33 The privacy policies of popular electronic communications
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him [the third
party] to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.
Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
133. See C. Ryan Reetz, Note, Warrant Requirement for Searches of Computerized
Information, 67 B.U. L. REv. 179, 193-94, 204 (1987).
As a practical matter, computer operators will always be able to obtain records
stored on their computers, regardless of password requirements or other file access
protection schemes.... Furthermore, many operating systems are not intended to
restrict the computer operator's access to files. In fact, the computer operator must
have access to certain types of individual records in order to perform necessary
functions. For example... to make 'backup' copies of the user's files to safeguard
against data loss, the operator must have access to the 'directory' specifying the
names, locations, and lengths of the user's files
* * * * [C]omputer operators have no legitimate purpose in reading records
unrelated to the operator's function, just as the telephone [sic] company has no
legitimate purpose in listening to the contents of conversations.

Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A FourthAmendment Modelfor ComputerNetworks and DataPrivacy,
81 VA. L. REv. 1181, 1203 (1995).
In making a backup copy, the system manager copies all data on the system to a
different set of media, over which he has complete and exclusive control. The
purpose of making a backup copy, however, is limited to protecting the data in
case of a computer failure. The system manager need not know the contents of the
copied data files, and the user's knowledge that the system manager will create
backup copies does not mean that the user expects the system manager to examine
the contents of that data.
Note, Keeping Secrets in Cyberspace: Establishing Fourth Amendment Protectionfor Internet
Communication, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1591, 1602 (1997).
The fact that her system administrator has the ability to monitor a computer user's
electronic communication should not constitute a disclosure of that
communication to the administrator (thereby vitiating areasonable expectation of
privacy in that communication): that a telephone operator has the ability to
monitor phone calls and may listen to parts of them for administrative purposes
does not render unreasonable an expectation of privacy in those conversations.
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services such as America Online (AOL) generally limit the scope of
disclosure of customer communications.'34 Therefore, the electronic
communications service user does have a legitimate expectation of privacy
as to the contents of electronic mail messages when the system manager
makes backup copies of such records and when the user chooses to store
his communications on an ISP's servers.
(iii) Private Carriers: Government Search May Not Exceed that of
Private Carrier
a. Walter v. United States: Third Party Must "Actually View"
Communications for such Communications to be Subject to
Government Access Within Scope of Private Search
Even if the contents of a communication can be accessed by a private
company, because the company stores copies of messages sent on its
service, the government's search of such contents may not exceed the
scope of the access actually had by the company. In Walter v. United
States,'35 an interstate shipment of several securely sealed packages
containing eight-millimeter films depicting homosexual activities was
mistakenly delivered by a private carrier to a third party rather than to the
consignee. Employees of the third party opened each of the packages,
finding individual film boxes, "on one side of which were suggestive
drawings, and on the other explicit descriptions of the contents."' 37 "One
employee opened one or two of the boxes, and attempted without success
to view portions of the film by holding it up to the light."'13 After the FBI
was notified and picked up the packages, agents viewed the films with a
to
projector "without [first] making any effort to obtain a warrant ' or
139
shipment.
the
of
consignee
the
or
consignor
the
communicate with
The U.S. Supreme Court stated,
No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected
with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters
134. See AOL Legal Dep't, Privacy Policy, availableat http://legal.web.aol.com/aol/aolpol/
privpol.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2001). AOL's "Privacy Policy" states "AOL does not read or
disclose private communications except to comply with valid legal process such as a search
warrant, subpoena, or court order, to protect the company's rights and property, or during
emergencies when we believe physical safety is at risk." Id.
135. 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
136. Seeid. at651.
137. Id. at651-52.
138. Id.at651.
139. Id.

20011
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and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as
to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great
principle embodied in the fourth amendment [sic] of the
Constitution. 4 '
The Court then reasoned that "the fact that the packages and one or more
of the boxes had been opened by a private party before they were acquired
by the FBI [does not] excuse the failure to obtain a search warrant.' 41
The government cited cases in which
there was nothing wrongful about the Government's acquisition of
the packages or its examination of their contents to the extent that
they had already been examined by third parties. Since that
examination had uncovered the labels, and since the labels
established probable cause to believe the films were obscene, the
Government argues that 42the limited private search justified an
unlimited official search.1
The U.S. Supreme Court responded "[t]hat argument must fail, whether we
or as an
view the official search as an expansion of the private search
143
independent search supported by its own probable cause."'
The U.S. Supreme Court made clear that it was not enough that a
private company had access to materials to support government access to
the same materials. 144 Rather, the private company must have actually
viewed the contents of the package sent in order to grant the government
the same privilege. 145 The U.S. Supreme Court stated:
If a properly authorized official search is limited by the particular
terms of its authorization, at least the same kind of strict limitation
must be applied to any official use of a private party's invasion of
another person's privacy .... [S]urely the Government may not
exceed the scope of the private search unless it has the right to
make an independent search. In these cases, the private party had
not actually viewed the films .... The projection of the films was
a significant expansion of the search that had been conducted
previously by a private party and therefore must be characterized as

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 655 n.5 (quoting Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1877)).
Id. at 656.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 657.
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a separate search. That separate search was not supported by any
exigency, 14or
by a warrant even though one could have easily been
6
obtained.
The U.S. Supreme Court continued,
petitioners expected no one except the intended recipient either to
open the 12 packages or to project the films.... The fact that the
cartons were unexpectedly opened by a third party before the
shipment was delivered to its intended consignee does not alter the
consignor's legitimate expectation of privacy. The private search
merely frustrated that expectation in part. It did not simply strip the
remaining unfrustrated portion of that expectation of all Fourth
Amendment protection. Since the additional search conducted by
the FBI - the screening of the films - was not supported by any
justification, it violated that Amendment.'47
b. United States v. Jacobsen: Scope of Search
The U.S. Supreme Court elaborated on its analysis of the effects of
private viewing of contents on government access in United States v.
Jacobsen.'48 In Jacobsen, the employees of a private freight carrier Federal Express - examined a package damaged and torn by a forklift
pursuant to a written company policy regarding insurance claims. 4 9 The
supervisor and office manager cut open the containers inside the package
and found a series of zip-lock plastic bags, the innermost containing a few
ounces of white powder.5 ' They summoned a federal agent, who removed
a trace of the powder, subjected it to a chemical test and determined that

146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. at 658-59. The U.S. Supreme Court added that
A partial invasion of privacy cannot automatically justify a total invasion. As
Learned Hand noted in a somewhat different context: "It is true that when one has
been arrested in his home or his office, his privacy has already been invaded; but
that interest, though lost, is altogether separate from the interest in protecting his
papers from indiscriminate rummage, even though both are customarily grouped
together as parts of the "right of privacy."
Id. at 659 n. 13 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 176 F.2d 732, 735 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd, 339
U.S. 56 (1950)).
148. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
149. Seeid. at Ill.
150. Id.
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it was cocaine. The question presented was whether the Fourth
Amendment required the agent to obtain a warrant before he did so.'
The U.S. Supreme Court, before announcing its holding, stated
This Court has... consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment]
as proscribing only governmental action; it is wholly inapplicable
"to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a
private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with
the participation or knowledge of any governmental official."' 52
However, the Court added that "[l]etters and other sealed packages are in
the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate
expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are
presumptively unreasonable.""' The U.S. Supreme Court then held that:
The initialinvasions of respondents' package were occasioned
by private action .... Whether those invasions were accidental or
deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they
did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private
character.
The additional invasions of respondents' privacy by the
government agent must be tested by the degree to which they
exceeded the scope of the private search.

[T]he removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the
agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled the agent to
learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the
privatesearch.It infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy and
hence was not a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 54
***

*

The U.S. Supreme Court thereby limited the federal government's
scope of access to materials exposed by a private entity such that it extends
no further than the access already allowed to the private service under the
actions or confidentiality practices of the private entity.'

151.
152.
153.
154.
standard
155.

Id.
Id. at 113 (citing Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).
Id. at 114.
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115, 120 (1984) (emphasis added) (citing the
adopted by the majority of the Court in Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980)).
See id. at 115-16 (citing Walter, 447 U.S. at 657).
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(iv) UnitedStates v. Jacobsen:Private Carrier Must Invite Search
Even if a private company has accessed materials, the government may
access such materials to the same extent only if the company invites the
government access.15 6 According to the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacobsen,
Respondents could have no privacy interest in the contents of the
package, since it remained unsealed and since the Federal Express
employees had just examined the package and had, of their own
accord, invited the federal agent to their offices for the express
purpose of viewing its contents. The agent's viewing of what a
private party had freely made available for his inspection did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
The package itself, which had previously been opened,
remained unsealed, and the Federal Express employees had invited
the agents to examine its contents. Under these circumstances, the
package could no longer support any expectation of privacy; it was
just like a balloon "the distinctive character [of which] spoke
volumes i57
as to its contents - particularly to the trained eye of the
* * * *

officer."'

Clearly, what is within a filled balloon is not comparable to what might
be inside a sent e-mail message. 8 Some portions of the Maxwell opinion

156. Id. at 119.
157. Id. at 119, 121 (emphasis added) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983)

(plurality opinion)).
158. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (citing
United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417-18 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) (stating

E-mail transmissions are not unlike other forms of modem communication. We
can draw parallels from these other mediums. For example, if a sender of
first-class mail seals an envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender can
reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the eyes of the
police absent a search wan-ant founded upon probable cause. However, once the
letter is received and opened, the destiny of the letter then lies in the control of the
recipient of the letter, not the sender, absent some legal privilege.

Drawing from these parallels, we can say that the transmitter of an e-mail
message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not intercept the
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have been interpreted by at least one federal court as meaning that "an email message, like a letter, cannot be afforded a reasonable expectation of
privacy once that message is received."'59 However, such an interpretation
would lead to the conclusion that, contrary to Jacobsen, a person has a
reduced expectation of privacy in letters sent through the mails and in
telephone conversations simply because the recipient of the mail or
another party
to the conversation might at some future time divulge its
60
contents.1

V. PROTECTIONS AFFORDED TO MAIL DELIVERED BY
THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

Like postal mail, electronic mail is written and can be saved for future
reference. Also like postal mail, e-mail can be "sealed" with the use of
passwords protecting user accounts. Insofar as electronic communications
are similar to traditional postal mail, it is worth considering the many
protections afforded traditional postal mail from government access.
A. Statutory Protectionsof FirstClass PostalMail
To our Founding Fathers, postal theft was a very serious matter. In
1792, a draconian Congressional act provided
That if any person or persons shall rob any carrier of the mail of the
United States, of such mail, or if any person shall rob the mail, in
which letters are sent to be conveyed by post, of any letter or
packet, or shall steal such mail, or shall steal and take from or out
of the same, or from or out of any post-office, any letter or packet,
such offender or offenders shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death.
Such a harsh penalty was subsequently mitigated in 1824, but first class
mail has largely retained its hallowed status. 6 '

transmission without probable cause and a search warrant. However, once the
transmissions are received by another person, the transmitter no longer controls
its destiny.)
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. See id.
161. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 17 (1 Stat. 237).
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For years, first class mail was defined as "matter closed against postal
inspection."' 162 Starting in 1970, the superceding legislation creating the
new U.S. Postal Service provided that
The Postal Service shall maintain one or more classes of mail for
the transmission of letters sealed against inspection.... No letter of
such a class of domestic origin shall be opened except under the
authority of a search warrant authorized by law, or by an officer or
employee of the Postal Service for the sole purpose of determining
an address at which the letter can
be delivered, or pursuant to the
63
authorization of the addressee.
Current statutory protections of postal mail additionally provide that
Whoever takes any letter . . . out of any post office or any
authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail
carrier. . . before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was
directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into
the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or
destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both."
Courts have held that this section "is designed to protect the mails and the
correspondence moving therein from... meddlesome prying."' 65 Another
such statute provides that "Whoever, being a Postal Service officer or
employee ...opens any letter... entrusted to him or which shall come
into his possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail...
shall be66 fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or
1
both."'
One could imagine a situation in which technological advances allowed
the U.S. Postal Service to cheaply and easily produce a copy of every
piece of mail it delivered automatically, through scanning technology not
requiring any human involvement. If such copies were made in case a
copy of the mail needed to be resent due to a delivery error, and the
making of such copies were found constitutional, provided the contents of
the copies were not accessed by the U.S. Postal Service. It is likely that
postal mail customers, like ISP customers using a service that saves copies
of messages sent through its service, would retain their reasonable
expectation of privacy in materials delivered through the mail, and the
162. 39 U.S.C. § 4251(a).
163. 39 U.S.C. § 3623(d) (2001).
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (2001).

165. United States v. Ashford, 530 F.2d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 1976).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (2001).
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copies would likely be covered by statutory protections afforded to mail
in a "mail route" under 18 U.S.C. § 1708.167
B. ConstitutionalProtectionsof PostalMail: Letters Protectedas if
Kept in Domicile
The longstanding statutory protection of postal mail from inspection
without a warrant reflects constitutional proscriptions. In Ex Parte
Jackson,6 ' the U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully
guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties
forwarding them in their own domiciles. The constitutional
guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers,
thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be. Whilst in the
mail, they can only be opened and examined under like warrant,
issued upon similar oath or affirmation, particularly describing the
thing to be seized, as is required when papers are subjected to
search in one's own household. No law of Congress can place in the
hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to
invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail;

167. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (2001) provides that
Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains, or attempts
so to obtain, from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box,
mail receptacle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail matter,
or from a letter or mail carrier, any letter

. . .

or [w]hoever steals, takes, or

abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains any letter, postal card, package, bag, or
mail, or any article or thing contained therein which has been left for collection
upon or adjacent to a collection box or other authorized depository of mail matter
... [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
Many cases have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1708. See United States v. Indelicato, 611 F.2d 376, 382
n.4 (1st Cir. 1979) (stating the language in this statute, including reference to "mail receptacle,"
must be read in light of realities of delivering and receiving mail in a modem urban environment)
(citing Smith v. United States, 343 F.2d 539, 542 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 861 (1965));
United States v. Lavin, 567 F.2d 579, 582-83 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding this section includes
misdelivered mail); United States v. White, 510 F.2d 448,451 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding this section
includes letter attached to mailbox by clothespin).
168. 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
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and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in
embodied in the fourth
subordination to the great principle
69
amendment of the Constitution. 1

A special agent of the Post Office explained in 1855 that "[t]he laws of
the land are intended not only to preserve the person and material property
of every citizen sacred from intrusion, but to secure the privacy of his
thoughts, so far as he sees fit to withhold them from others."' 7 ° Congress
made mail interception intended "to pry into another's business or secrets"
a criminal offense.' 7 '
Ultimately, courts have made clear that "the privacy of a sealed item
bearing the proper amount of postage for a first class item is protected
from warrantless opening, not because it is given the appellation 'first
class' but because the Constitution commands that result."'7 2 Even
169. Id. at 733 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970)
("It has long been held that first-class mail such as letters and sealed packages subject to letter
postage - as distinguished from newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed matter is free from inspection by postal authorities, except in the manner provided by the Fourth
Amendment.") (quoting approvingly the dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in United States ex
rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting), in which Justice Holmes stated that "the use of the mails is almost as much a part of
free speech as the right to use our tongues.").
170. J. HOLBROOK, TEN YEARS AMONG THE MAIL BAGS xviii (Phila. 1855).
171. Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 23 (4 Stat. 102) (imposing criminal penalty against any
person opening letters en route). This section is believed to have been drafted chiefly by Daniel
Webster. See 5 CONG. REC. 444 (1877) (remarks of Sen. Conkling). Similar provisions had been
enacted by the Continental Congress. See 21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789, at
671 (W. Ford ed. 1782).
172. United States v. Phillips, 478 F.2d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 1973). Recently, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the government's use of sense-enhancing technology to gather information
regarding the interior of a home that could not have been obtained otherwise without a physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a "search" of the premises, requiring a
warrant. See Kyollo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (2001).
[T]here is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To
withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to permit police
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We think
that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search - at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This
assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed
when the Fourth Amendment was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the
information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a
search. (quotations and citations omitted).
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prisoners have been held to have some reasonable expectation of privacy
in mail sent through the U.S. Postal Service. 73
C. Password-ProtectedElectronic CommunicationsAccounts Are the
Modern Equivalent of "Sealed Letters"
E-mail accounts protected by passwords should also establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy, as a password functions as a seal on a
letter, or a closed container, hiding its contents until a password is given.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that by placing information within "a
closed, opaque container," a person exhibits an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the container. 74 Further, the
Fourth Amendment protects a closed container whether it is locked or not,
regardless of the strength of the container. 175 Courts have held that the use

173. See United States v. Savage, 482 F.2d 1371, 1373 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that "absent
a showing of some justifiable purpose of imprisonment or prison security, the interception and
photocopying of [defendant's] letter was violative of his Fourth Amendment rights and the letter
should have been excluded as evidence"); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776, 791 (D.R.I.
1970).
[T]his Court . . . is of the opinion that the conduct of the ACL officials of
indiscriminately opening and reading all prisoner mail including that of
unconvicted awaiting trial inmates, whether the same be from the inmates or
members of the free society, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment.... It is this
Court's opinion that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
is one of the rights retained by prisoners subject, of course, to such curtailment as
may be made necessary by the purposes of confinement and the requirements of
security.
Id.
174. Robbins v. Cal., 453 U.S. 420, 426 (1981); see also United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d
165, 174 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Ilt is settled that the Fourth Amendment's protection against
'unreasonable searches and seizures' protects a citizen against the warrantless opening of sealed
letters and packages addressed to him in order to examine the contents.").
175. See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 426-27.
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of passwords to access e-mail accounts indicates users have an objective
expectation76 of privacy in the communications transmitted between such
accounts.1
The American Bar Association (ABA) has also stated that lawyers
transmitting information related to their representation of clients have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic communications because
"[t]he denial of external access ordinarily is ensured by the use of
password-protected mailboxes or encryption.' 77 Ultimately, the ABA
concluded that "[t]he same privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail...
applies to Internet e-mail."' 78

176. See United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568,576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (holding that
"appellant clearly had an objective expectation of privacy in those messages stored in computers
which he alone could retrieve through the use of his own assigned password. Similarly, he had an
objective expectation of privacy with regard to messages he transmitted electronically to other
subscribers of the service who also had individually assigned passwords"), rev'don other grounds,
45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996); see alsoNote, supra note 133, at 1603. ("Cyberspace communication
should be protected with a password to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.").
Courts have similarly held that users of pager devices have an objective expectation of privacy
in the lists of incoming telephone numbers stored in the pager's memory. See United States v.
Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
In contiast to the transmitter of a message to a pager, the possessor of the pager
has control over the electronically stored information. The expectation of privacy
in an electronic repository for personal data is therefore analogous to that in a
personal address book or other repository for such information.
See also United States v. Reyes, 922 F. Supp. 818, 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Chan and holding
that pager user "had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the pager's memory");
United States v. Lynch, 908 F. Supp. 284,287 (D.V.I. 1995) (stating pager users have a"reasonable
expectation of privacy").
177. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) (concluding
that "[l]awyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all forms of
e-mail, including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some risk of interception and
disclosure," and stating that
[a] lawyer may transmit information related to the representation of a client by
unencrypted e-mail sent over the Internet without violating the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (1998) [Model Rule 1.6(a), "Confidentiality of
Information," requiring that information related to client representation be kept in
confidence] because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable expectation of
privacy from a technological and legal standpoint.).
ld.
178. Id.
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VI. THE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT

A document is accessible to the government through means other than
a warrant. When a document suspected of being involved in a crime is
located among other protected documents, the government remains free to
subpoena the seizable documents, thus allowing the individual in
possession, or his counsel, to separate the documents from papers
protected by the Fourth Amendment. While the statutory and constitutional
protections of communications sent through the U.S. Postal Service
express a preference for warrants before such communications can be
accessed by the government, Congress has expressed a preference for the
use of subpoenas rather than warrants in cases in which information is
sought from entities engaged in First Amendment activities involving the
communication of ideas to the public. 79
A. Originsin Zucher v. Stanford Daily: Focus on ProtectingAll Third
Party Non-Suspectsfrom OverbroadSearches
The Act has its origins in the case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily.80 In
Zurcher, a university student newspaper and various staff members
challenged the constitutionality of a search warrant for negatives, films,
and pictures on the newspaper's premises revealing the identities of
demonstrators who assaulted police officers during a confrontation. 8' The
newspaper claimed that federal officials should have proceeded with a
subpoena duces tecum, which was less intrusive than a search warrant.'
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated,
The issue here is how the Fourth Amendment is to be construed and
applied to the "third party" search, the recurring situation where
state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits,
instrumentalities, or other evidence of crime is located on identified
property but do not then have probable cause to believe that the
owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the
crime that has occurred or is occurring.' 83

179.
amended
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-12 (2001)).
436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Id. at 550.
Id.
Id. at 553.
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The U.S. Supreme Court held the application of a warrant rather than
a subpoena in Zurcher was constitutional, stating that:
[I]f the third party knows that contraband or other illegal materials
are on his property, he is sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance
of a search warrant. Similarly, if his ethical stance is the
determining factor, it seems to us that whether or not he knows that
the sought-after articles are secreted on his property and whether or
not he knows that the articles are in fact the fruits, instrumentalities,
or evidence of crime, he will be so informed when the search
warrant is served, and it is doubtful that he should then be permitted
to object to the search, to withhold, if it is there, the evidence of
crime reasonably believed to be possessed by him or secreted on his
property, and to forbid the search and insist that the officers serve
him with a subpoena duces tecum.1 84
B. The Privacy ProtectionAct Covers All
Who Communicate to the Public
In response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher, Congress
passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980 (the Act).' 85 The Act provides
protections to citizens beyond those offered by the U.S. Constitution by
requiring police to use subpoenas,186 rather than search warrants, to effect
184. Id. at 560. The Court also held that no special constitutional protections from search
warrants should be afforded to newspapers beyond the protections afforded all citizens under the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 565. The Court stated that if "[p]roperly administered, the
preconditions for a warrant - probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, and overall reasonableness- should afford sufficient protection against
the harms that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices." Id. at 565.
Justice Powell elaborated on this principle in his concurring opinion stating that
If the Framers had believed that the press was entitled to a special procedure, not
available to others, when government authorities required evidence in its
possession, one would have expected the terms of the Fourth Amendment to
reflect that belief.... [Tihe struggle from which the Fourth Amendment emerged
was that between Crown and press.... The Framers were painfully aware of that
history, and their response to it was the Fourth Amendment.... Hence, there is
every reason to believe that the usual procedures contemplated by the Fourth
Amendment do indeed apply to the press, as to every other person.
Id. at 569 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
185. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-12).
186. A subpoena duces tecum is "[a] court process, initiated by a party in litigation,
compelling production of certainspecific documents and other items, material and relevant to facts
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searches on the premises of non-suspects engaged in First Amendment
activities.' 87
Congress concluded that the new law would cover only those parties
involved in First Amendment-related activities, rather than covering all
non-suspect third parties.' The premise of the Act was that the subpoena,
a less intrusive means of obtaining evidence, offered better protection of
innocent news organizations than the search warrant."8 9 Thus, under the
Act, when dealing with non-suspect news organizations that have
information to disseminate to the public, law enforcement officers must
use a subpoena in all but a few instances when seeking evidence in a
criminal investigation."'
The Act provides that
Notwithstanding any other law, it shall be unlawful for a
government officer or employee, in connection with the
investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense, to search for or

in issue in a pending judicial proceeding, which documents and items are in custody and control
of a person or body served with process." BLACK's L. DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis
added) (citing FED. R. Civ. 45 and FED. R. CRIM. 17).
187. See id.
188. S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 8, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3955. The Senate Report notes
that, at the hearing on the proposed Privacy Protection Act, "During this as well as earlier hearings,
with the exception of the Department of Justice, not a single witness in favor of the legislation
testified that the protections of the bill should be limited to the press alone." S. Rep. No. 96-874,
at 8 (1980). Nevertheless, the statute as enacted was intended to grant publishers certain statutory
rights to discourage law enforcement officers from targeting publishers simply because they often
gathered "mere evidence" of crime, rather than inherently illegal contraband items such as
narcotics. The legislative history indicates that
the purpose of this statute is to limit searches for materials held by persons
involved in First Amendment activities who are themselves not suspected of
participation in the criminal activity for which the materials are sought, and not
to limit the ability of law enforcement officers to search for and seize materials
held by those suspected of committing the crime under investigation.
Id. at 11.
189. See S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 4, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950-51.
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2001); see also S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 4-5, reprintedin 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3950-51.
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seize any work product materials.9 ' [or documentary materials 92
that are] possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a
purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast,
or other similar form of public communication, in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce...."

191. The Act defines "[dlocumentary materials" as:
materials upon which information is recorded, and includes, but is not limited to,
written or printed materials, photographs, motion picture films, negatives, video
tapes, audio tapes, and other mechanically, magnetically or electronically recorded
cards, tapes, or discs, but does not include contraband or the fruits of a crime or
things otherwise criminally possessed, or property designed or intended for use,
or which is or has been used as, the means of committing a criminal offense.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(aa-7(a)) (2001).
192. The Act defines "[w]ork product materials" as:
materials, other than contraband or the fruits of a crime or things otherwise
criminally possessed, or property designed or intended for use, or which is or has
been used, as the means of committing a criminal offense, and - (1) in
anticipation of communicating such materials to the public, are prepared,
produced, authored, or created, whether by the person in possession of the
materials or by any other person; (2) are possessed for the purposes of
communicating such materials to the public; and (3) include mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or theories of the person who prepared, produced, authored,
or created such material.
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-7(b) (2001).
193. The Act provides for the following exceptions to the subpoena requirement:
this provision shall not impair or affect the ability of any government officer or
employee, pursuant to otherwise applicable law, to search for or seize such
materials, if- (1) there is probable cause to believe that the person possessing
such materials has committed or is committing the criminal offense to which the
materials relate: Provided, however, that a government officer or employee may
not search for or seize such materials under the provisions of this paragraph if the
offense to which the materials relate consists of the receipt, possession,
communication, or withholding of such materials or the information contained
therein (but such a search or seizure may be conducted under the provisions of this
paragraph if the offense consists of the receipt, possession, or communication of
information relating to the national defense, classified information, or restricted
data [under various statutes] or if the offense involves the production, possession,
receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child
pornography, the sexual exploitation of children, or the sale or purchase of
children [under various sections of Title 18); or (2) there is reason to believe that
the immediate seizure of such materials is necessary to prevent the death of, or
serious bodily injury to, a human being.
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2001).

A REVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS

The Senate Report makes clear why a subpoena was preferred by the
Congress over a search warrant. The Senate Report notes that the
legislation
makes documentary materials the subject for protection from search
and seizure for several reasons, all of them with historical roots.
First, personal papers have been singled out throughout our legal
history because courts ... have perceived their special significance
to privacy interests. . . . A search for papers almost invariably
entails rummaging, however, and thus constitutes a further invasion
of privacy. The process of a search through files presents the
opportunityfor the police officer
to view a great deal of material
94
extraneous to the warrant.
C. The Privacy ProtectionAct's Implementing
RegulationsApply to All Non-Suspect Third Parties
In the final section of the Act, Congress ordered the Justice Department
to develop guidelines for federal agents' use of subpoenas for a broader
class of non-suspects in addition to third parties engaged in First
Amendment activities. 95 This final section provides the standards that the
Department of Justice was to use in its development of the guidelines. 96
In 1981, the Justice Department issued its "Guidelines on Methods of
Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Parties" (Methods
194. S. Rep. No. 96-874, at 16-17 (1980) (emphasis added).
195. The Senate Report notes that "At several points during consideration of this legislation,
the [Justice] Department mentioned internal guidelines as a preferable alternative to a statute." Id.
at9.
196. The Act provides the following:
(a) Procedures to obtain documentary evidence; protection of certain privacy
interests. The Attorney General shall, within six months.., issue guidelines for
the procedures to be employed by any Federal officer or employee, in connection
with the investigation or prosecution of an offense, to obtain documentary
materials in the private possession of a person.., not reasonably believed to be
a suspect in such offense .... The Attorney General shall incorporate in such
guidelines - (1) a recognition of the personal privacy interests of the person in
possession of such documentary materials; (2) a requirement that the least
intrusive method... of obtaining such materials be used... ; (3) a recognition of
special concern for privacy interests ... between clergyman and parishioner;
lawyer and client; or doctor and patient; and (4) a requirement that an application
for a warrant to conduct a search governed by this subchapter be approved by an
attorney for the government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-I I to -12 (2001) (emphasis added).
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Guidelines) in response to Congress' directive in the Privacy Protection
Act) 9 7 This process is triggered whenever evidence relevant to a criminal
investigation is in the hands of a non-suspect, whether they are engaged in
the communication of ideas to the public or not.'98 The Methods
Guidelines define "disinterested third party" as "a person or organization
not reasonably believed to be (1) A suspect in the criminal offense to
which the materials sought under these guidelines relate; or (2) Related by
blood or marriage to such a suspect."' 99 The Methods Guidelines define the
term "documentary materials" as
any materials upon which information is recorded, and includes, but
is not limited to, written or printed materials, photographs, films or
negatives, audio or video tapes, or materials upon which
information is electronically or magnetically recorded, but does not
include materials which constitute contraband, the fruits or
instrumentalities of a crime, or things otherwise criminally
possessed.2

197. See Guidelines on Methods of Obtaining Documentary Materials Held by Third Parties,
28 C.F.R. §§ 59.1-.6 (2001).
198. The "Introduction" to the Methods Guidelines states:
(a) A search for documentary materials necessarily involves intrusions into
personal privacy... [Tihe execution of such a search may require examination of
private papers within the scope of the search warrant, but not themselves subject
to seizure. In addition, where such a search involves intrusions into professional,
confidential relationships, the privacy interests of other persons are also
implicated. (b) It is the responsibility of federal officers and employees to
recognize the importance of these personal privacy interests, and to protect against
unnecessary intrusions. Generally, when documentary materials are held by a
disinterested third party, a subpoena, administrative summons, or governmental
request will be an effective alternative to the use of a search warrant and will be
considerably less intrusive. The purpose of the guidelines set forth in this part is
to assure that federal officers and employees do not use search and seizure to
obtain documentary materials in the possession of disinterested third parties unless
reliance on alternative means would substantially jeopardize their availability
(e.g., by creating a risk of destruction, etc.) or usefulness (e.g., by detrimentally
delaying the investigation, destroying a chain of custody, etc.). Therefore, the
guidelines in this part establish certain criteria and procedural requirements which
must be met before a search warrant may be used to obtain documentary materials
held by disinterested third parties. The guidelines in this part are not intended to
inhibit the use of less intrusive means of obtaining documentary materials such as
the use of a subpoena, summons, or formal or informal request.
28 C.F.R. § 59.1 (2001) (emphasis added).
199. 28 C.F.R. § 59.2.
200. Id.
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The Methods Guidelines do not restrict their applicability to
organizations engaged in the delivery of communications to the public.
Rather, the Methods Guidelines "apply... to the procedures used by any
federal officer or employee, in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of a criminal offense, to obtain documentary materials in the
private possession of a disinterested third party."' ' The Methods
Guidelines provide for sanctions if they are not followed, but these
sanctions are not subject to litigation.0 2
The Privacy Protection Act and its implementing Methods Guidelines
thus require that a narrowly-drawn subpoena be issued to ISPs that
201 whereas a
administer
electronically
based communications
general and
broad subpoena
is allowed byservices,
the ECPA
when
201. 28 C.F.R. § 59.3(a) (2001). The required procedures are as follows:
(a) Provisions governing the use of search warrants generally. (1) A search
warrant should not be used to obtain documentary materials believed to be in the
private possession of a disinterested third party unless it appears that the use of a
subpoena, summons, request, or other less intrusive alternative means of obtaining
the materials would substantially jeopardize the availability or usefulness of the
materials sought, and the application for the warrant has been authorized as
provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section. (2) No federal officer or employee
shall apply for a warrant to search for and seize documentary materials believed
to be in the private possession of a disinterested third party unless the application
for the warrant has been authorized by an attorney for the government. Provided,
however, that in an emergency situation in which the immediacy of the need to
seize the materials does not permit an opportunity to secure the authorization of
an attorney for the government, the application may be authorized by a
supervisory law enforcement officer in the applicant's department or agency, if the
appropriate United States Attorney (or where the case is not being handled by a
United States Attorney's Office, the appropriate supervisory official of the
Department of Justice) is notified of the authorization and the basis for justifying
such authorization under this part within 24 hours of the authorization.
28 C.F.R. § 59.4(a) (2001).
202. 28 C.F.R. § 59.6 (2001) states:
(a) Any federal officer or employee violating the guidelines set forth in this part
shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action by the agency or department by
which he is employed. (b) Pursuant to section 202 of the Privacy Protection Act
of 1980 (Sec. 202, Pub.L. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (42 U.S.C. 2000aa-12)), an issue
relating to the compliance, or the failure to comply, with the guidelines set forth
in this part may not be litigated, and a court may not entertain such an issue as the
basis for the suppression or exclusion of evidence.
203. Although Congress may not have envisioned the possibility when it enacted the Privacy
Protection Act, the use of personal computers for publishing and the World Wide Web has
dramatically expanded the scope of who is involved in FirstAmendment activities. Today, anyone
with a computer and access to the Internet may be a publisher who possesses materials protected
under the Act.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OFTECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6

communications are sought from the ISP or other provider, including
communications that are personal communications that were intended to
be kept private, and not publicly revealed." 4

VII. GENERAL RULE:

SUBPOENAS MUST DESCRIBE DOCUMENTS TO BE

PRODUCED WITH "REASONABLE PARTICULARITY"

The privacy-protective nature of a subpoena derives not only from the
ability of those upon whom it is served to challenge the validity of the
subpoena before a search takes place, but also from the general
requirement that subpoenas be within the bounds of Fourth Amendment
limits by describing with sufficient particularity the documents requested.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Hale v. Henkel, 5 held that:
[A]n order for the production of books and papers may constitute
an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment.
While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law,
and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner,
still.., the substance of the offense is the compulsory production
of private papers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena
duces tecum, against which the person, be he individual or
corporation, is entitled to protection. Applying the test of
reasonableness to the present case, we think the subpoena duces
tecum is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable.2 6
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Hale that,
Doubtless many, if not all, of these documents may ultimately be
required, but some necessity should be shown, either from an
examination of the witnesses orally, or from the known transactions
of these companies with the other companies implicated, or some
204. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2001).
205. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
206. Id. at 76. The subpoena at issue in Hale did
not require the production of a single contract, or of contracts with a particular
corporation, or a limited number of documents, but all understandings, contracts,
or correspondence between the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, and no less than
six different companies, as well as all reports made and accounts rendered by such
companies from the date of the organization of the MacAndrews & Forbes
Company, as well as all letters received by that company since its organization
from more than a dozen different companies, situated in seven different states in
the Union.

Id. at 76-77.
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evidence of their materiality produced, to justify an order for the
production of such a mass of papers. A general subpoena of this
description is equally indefensible as a search warrant would be if
couched in similar terms. 0 7
Still other cases have quashed subpoenas because they sought information
from sources that could be expected to contain sensitive information not
likely to be relevant to the investigation. 08
Finally, courts have quashed subpoenas that are overly broad, despite
the fact that no significant burdens arise in collecting and relinquishing the
records because they are located within a computer. 0 9 In In re GrandJury
Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 15, 1993, the Court relied on
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) to quash a subpoena that
demanded all computer hard drives and floppy diskettes."' The Court

207. Id. at 77; see also In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867, reh 'g
denied, 414 U.S. 1052 (1973) (stating subpoena requested all records stored in three filing cabinets
without seeking to distinguish according to content or time frame and thereby included personal
documents such as wills and trust agreements). "[The Fourth Amendment] 'guards against abuse
.. . by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly
described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the
materials specified are relevant." Oklahoma Press Pub'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,208 (1946);
see also Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 143 (1928) (upholding subpoena because it
"specifies... with reasonable particularity the subjects to which the documents called for relate").
208. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 342 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1972)
(quashing subpoena requesting lawyers' files protected by attorney-client privilege for lack of
specificity in identifying documents); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 626 F.Supp. 1057, 1061
(D.P.R. 1986), modified on other grounds 814 F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating subpoena to travel
agency compelling production of all records pertaining to petitioner was overly broad insofar as
it encompassed travel by petitioner's friends, relations, attorney, and witnesses at his forthcoming
trial on another matter); In re Certain Chinese Families Benevolent & Dist. Ass'ns, 19 F.R.D. 97,
98, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (rejecting subpoenas requiring various Chinese family associations to
produce available membership lists, income records, and membership photographs, dating back to
the association's origin, for use in an investigation of fraud by various persons claiming derivative
citizenship as offspring of American citizen fathers).
209. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp 11
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973)); see also Van Westrienen v.
Americontinental Collection Corp., 189 F.R.D. 440,441 (D. Ore. 1999) (holding that "[p]laintiffs
are not entitled to unbridled access [of] defendants' computer system.... Plaintiffs should pursue
other less burdensome alternatives, such as identifying the number of letters and their content");
Symantec Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, 10 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff's request for the production of copies of all hard drives that had access to a specific server
was unduly burdensome); In re Brand Name Prescription Drug Antitrust Litigation, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8281, 7-8 (N.D. Il. 1995) (narrowing broad requests of plaintiffs and requiring parties to
agree upon "meaningful limitations" on the scope of any e-mail search).
210. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated Nov. 15, 846 F. Supp. at 12. Fed.
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) provides that a subpoena may be quashed or modified "if
compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive."
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reasoned that the government ignored the possible use of "key word"
searches to limit its demand to documents containing particular words or
identifying particular categories of documents showing relevancy."' The
Court noted that
[t]he subpoena demands that X Corporation provide the grand jury
with the central processing unit (including the hard disk drive) of
any computer supplied by X Corporation for the use of specified
officers and employees of X Corporation, or their assistants. It
demands also all computer-accessible data (including floppy
diskettes) created by any of the specified officers and employees or
their assistants. In addition to corporate records, personal
documents are stored on the subpoenaed devices, including
personal financial information, . . . a draft of an employee's will,
. . and legal documents relating to the Chairman's personal
*

funding of a third party's purchase of certain goods.212
The Court went on to explain the significance of In re Horowitz to the case
as follows:
The subpoena at issue here is not framed in terms of specified
categories of information. Rather, it demands specified information
storage devices - namely, particular computer hard drives and
floppy disks that contain some data concededly irrelevant to the
grand jury inquiry...

***

*

Implicit in In re Horowitz is a determination that subpoenas

properly are interpreted as seeking categories of paper documents,
not categories of filing cabinets. Because it is easier in the computer
age to separate relevant from irrelevant documents, . . . [the]

ontological choice between filing cabinets and paper documents has
even greater force when applied to the modem analogues of these
earlier methods of storing information.
The current matter warrants a resolution similar to that in In re
Horowitz. Government counsel have conceded on behalf of the
grand jury that the subpoena demands irrelevant documents.
Moreover, the government has acknowledged that a "key word"
search of the information stored on the devices would reveal which
of the documents are likely to be relevant to the grand jury's
211. Seeid. at l3.
212. Id. at 12 (citations omitted).
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investigation.. . . It follows that a subpoena demanding documents
containing specified key words would identify relevant documents
without requiring the production of irrelevant documents. To the
extent the grand jury has reason to suspect that subpoenaed
documents are being withheld, a court-appointed expert could
search the hard drives and floppy disks [pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 706(a)].213
The Court concluded that the "investigation does notjustify a subpoena
which encompasses documents completely irrelevant to its scope,
particularly because the government has acknowledged that relevant
documents can be isolated through key-word searching."2" 4 Therefore,
even if subpoenaed records are easily ascertainable because they are in the
form of electronic communications, the government still must narrowly
tailor their subponea request to specific pieces of information.
VIII. THE CCIPS GUIDELINES' MODEL SUBPOENAS DIRECTED AT
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDERS REPRESENT OVERBROAD
REQUESTS THAT ARE DISCOURAGED IN THE LAW

The CCIPS Guidelines provide sample language to be used by the
government for search warrants and affadavits to search and seize
computers as well as a model subpoena to be used by the government
when requesting electronic information either in1 5electronic storage or from
a remote computing service under the ECPA.
The ECPA provides that "[a] governmental entity may require a
provider of [RCS] to disclose the contents of any electronic
communication [if the government gives] ...prior notice ...to the
subscriber or customer[, and] if the government... obtains a court order
for such disclosure."2 6 In obtaining such court order under the ECPA, the
government need only present to a judge "specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the.., records
are relevant and material to an ongoing
or other information sought,
' 17
investigation."
criminal
The government can also bypass the ECPA's notice requirement for a
period of ninety days if the government demonstrates that prior notice to
the subscriber or customer could seriously jeopardize the ongoing
213. Id. at 13 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted). Fed. Rule of Evidence 706(a) provides
that the Court "may appoint expert witness of its own selection.... A witness so appointed shall
advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any."
214. Id.
215. See KERR supra note 47, at apps. B, E, F (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2001)).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(l)(B)(ii) (2001).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2001).
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investigation by giving the subscriber an opportunity to destroy evidence,
change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, or flee or continue his
flight from prosecution.218
Once the government has given sufficient notice, the court order may
require a RCS to provide electronic communication that is held or
maintained on that service (A) on behalf of, and received by means of
electronic transmission from (or created by means of computer processing
of communications received by means of electronic transmission from),
a subscriber or customer of such RCS; and (B) solely for the purpose of
providing storage or computer processing services to such subscriber or
customer, if the provider is not authorized to access the contents of any
such communications for purposes of providing any services other than
storage or computer processing.21 9
The model subpoena provided by the CCIPS provides that such
electronic communications "include the content of electronic mail that has
been opened, viewed, downloaded, or otherwise accessed by the recipient
and is held remotely by the [RCS] provider on its computers."22
Once such a subpoena is obtained, the government makes a specific
request to the remote computing service for the content of the electronic
communications listed under the subpoena as follows:
You are to provide the following information as printouts,... [t]he
contents of electronic communications (not in electronic storage)
that were placed or stored in directories or files owned or controlled
by the accounts [of subscribers] at any time after [date] up through
" '
and including the date of this Order.22
This model subpoena electronic communication content request is very
broad, specifying only a date range with no reference to any particular
subject matter. The model subpoena is therefore akin to the general
warrants the Founding Fathers sought to prevent, and to the general
requests for telegrams that confronted courts upon the introduction of
telegraph technology, and which courts quashed as overbroad.222
In addition to requesting specific contents of electronic communication,
the model subpoena also provides language to obtain electronic
communication that is in electronic storage:

218. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a) (2001).
219. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(2) (2001).
220. KERR, supra note 47, at apps. B, 8-9. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(b), 2703(d), 2711(2) (the
term "remote computing service" means "the provision to the public of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications system").
221. KERR, supra note 47, at app. B, Attachment 1, C.
222. See § VII supra.

A REVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS

The following is sample language for obtaining the content of
communications when permitted by [the] ECPA ....
A. The contents of electronic communications not in "electronic
storage" (i.e., electronic mail that has already been opened by the
user) currently held or maintained in the account associated with the
address "
" (registered to
) sent
from or to the above account during the period
through
(inclusive).
B. The content of all electronic communications in "electronic
storage" for more than 180 days associated with the accounts
identified in Part A, that were placed or stored in
computer systems in directories or files owned or controlled by
such accounts atany time up through and including the date of this
subpoena.223
This request in the model subpoena would exclude only the category
of electronic communications that are unopened incoming electronic
communications that have been stored by a RCS for less than 180 days.
This model subpoena language is also very broad.
In contrast to the broad language proposed by the model subpoena
issued to a RCS provider, the CCIPS's proposed language for a search
warrant to search and seize an individual's computer and its hard drive is
more precise.224 The CCIPS Guidelines contain the following suggested
language for such warrants: "The first step in drafting a warrant to search
and seize computers or computer data is to describe the property to be
seized for the warrant itself. This requires a particularized description of
the evidence, contraband, fruits, or instrumentality
of crime that the agents
225
hope to obtain by conducting the search...."
The guidelines also offer the following examples of how to describe
property to be seized under a warrant when the computer hardware is
merely a storage container for electronic evidence:
All records relating to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (drug
trafficking) and/or 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy to traffic drugs)
involving [the suspect] since January 1, 1996, including lists of
customers and related identifying information; types, amounts, and
prices of drugs trafficked as well as dates, places, and amounts of
specific transactions; any information related to sources of narcotic
223.
224.
to Search
225.

KERR, supra note 47, at app. E (emphasis added).
See id.at app. F "Sample Language for Search Warrants and Accompanying Affidavits
and Seize Computers."
See id. at app. F, § (I).
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addresses, phone numbers, or any other
any information recording [the suspect's]
[date] to the present; all bank records,
account information, and other financial

This language is much more particular regarding its specifications of
offenses, allowing a more focused search of materials most likely to be
relevant to an investigation of the listed offenses.
The CCIP Guidelines also contains suggested language for a warrant
served on an ISP. However, the proposed language directed to an ISP is
much broader than that directed at the individual owner of a computer hard
drive:
All storedelectronic mail of any kind sent to, from and through the
e-mail address [JDoe@isp.com], or associated with the user name
"John Doe," or account holder [suspect]. Content and connection
log files of all account activity from January 1, 2000, through
March 31, 2000, by the user associated with the e-mail address
[Jdoe@isp.com], including records showing the subscriber's full
name, all screen names associated with that subscriber and account,
all account names associated with that subscriber, methods of
payment, phone numbers, all residential, business, mailing, and email addresses, detailed billing records, types and lengths of
service, and any other identifying information.227

226. Id. § (II).
227. Id. (emphasis added). Unlike the guidelines, the ABA's Task Force on Tech. & Law
Enforcement has drafted proposed standards for government access to electronic communications
that would require, in an electronic surveillance order issued to an ISP, a more particular
description of the offense as to which the electronic surveillance is approved and of the
communications sought. These standards were approved by the ABA's Criminal Justice Council
on July 9, 2000, for presentation to the House of Delegates in Feb. 2001. These standards provide
that an electronic surveillance "order should be issued in writing signed by the judge and contain
the following information: ... a specification of the particular offense as to which electronic
surveillance is approved [and] a particular description of the communications sought to be
intercepted .... See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Electronic Surveillance (3d. ed.), sect.
A: Electronic Surveillance of Private Communications (Feb. 2001), Standard 2-4.8(e), (f).
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IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

A. The History of CommunicationsProtectionsPoints to the Need to
Strengthen the ECPA 's Protections of the Confidentiality
of ElectronicCommunications
Recent Fourth Amendment precedents analyzing "reasonable
expectations of privacy," as well as precedents recognizing a limit to such
an analysis, 2 28 support a heightened requirement for government access to
electronic communications and copies of such communications, regardless
of the length of time such communications have been placed in electronic
storage by an ISP. The drafters of the Fourth Amendment assumed that a
warrant would be required to authorize government access to written
personal communications, and that the Fourth Amendment would prevent
overly broad warrants from issuing.229 The similarity of electronic
communications to traditional postal mail - including their written nature
and the "seals" provided by e-mail account passwords 23 - support the
need for Congress to provide statutory protections for electronic
communications similar to those protecting postal mail from government

228. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 n.5 (1979) ("Situations can be imagined, of
course, in which Katz's two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of Fourth
Amendment protection."); Rakas v. Ill., 439 U.S. 128, 144, n.12 (1978) ("Legitimation of
expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by
reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society.").
229. See Davies, supranote 63, at 551-52.
230. See United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 174 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[Ilt is settled that the
Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable searches and seizures' protects a citizen
against the warrantless opening of sealed letters and packages addressed to him in order to examine
the contents.") (quoting E ParteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1879)); United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J.
568, 576 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) ("[A]ppellant clearly had an objective expectation of privacy
in those messages stored in computers which he alone could retrieve through the use of his own
assigned password. Similarly, he had an objective expectation of privacy with regard to messages
he transmitted electronically to other subscribers of the service who also had individually assigned
passwords."), rev'd on other grounds, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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access, within the framework of constitutional protections afforded postal
mail,23 ' which electronic mail, like telegrams in the nineteenth century, is
increasingly replacing.232
B. Copies of Electronic CommunicationsStored by ISPs Should Receive
the Same Protectionsfrom Government Access as the Original
Electronic Communications
Current legal standards applied to electronic written communications,
under which the government's access to copies of electronic
communications is governed by a lower standard233 than that governing its
access to the contents of communications stored on an individual's home
computer hard drive,234 is generally not supported by the consent exception
to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment,235 nor is it

231. See Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("The constitutional guaranty of the right
of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers, thus closed against inspection, wherever they may be.... No law of Congress can place in
the hands of officials connected with the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters
and such sealed packages in the mail .... ) (emphasis added); ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof'l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999) ("The same privacy accorded U.S. and commercial mail
... applies to Internet e-mail.").
232. See Ex parte Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 91 (1880) (involving subpoena of telegram
communications conducted over new telegraph technology).
The facts that railroad train orders are generally communicated by telegraph, that
a vast amount of trade and traffic is transacted through this medium, that it has
become of almost equal importance in the commerce of this country, with the
postal system, and that in a business sense, men are compelled to transmit
communications by the telegraph, are for the consideration of the legislative
branch of the government in determining the propriety of placing telegraphic
communications on the same footing with correspondence by mail.
Id.
233. The government need only present to ajudge "specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the ... records or other information sought [from an
ISP] are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2001).
234. Original electronic messages stored on a personal computer hard drive and, according to
the understanding of the CCIPS Guidlines, unopened electronic messages stored by an ISP for less
than 180 days, may be seized by the government only pursuant to a warrant based on a showing of
"probable cause." See Guidelines supra note 47, at 65; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
235. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) (bank customer has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of his original checks and deposit stubs because
they "contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees
in the ordinary course of business") (emphasis added).
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supported by the fact that third party ISPs have access to such copies."'
The fact that an ISP is storing electronic communications for a customer
does not justify a search of the contents of such communications insofar
as such a search has not been conducted in accordance with the ISP's
confidentiality policies governing ISP employee access to the contents of
customer communications.237 Consequently, Congress should consider
amending the ECPA to make clear that government access to electronic
communications, and copies of such communications, is subject to the
same protections, whether or not an ISP customer has already accessed the
communication. Such action would serve to increase consumer confidence
in the confidentiality of electronic communications and avoid discouraging

236. See A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 306-07, n. I (Thomas M. Cooley ed.,
3d. ed. 1874) (discussing invention of the telegraph).
[The telegraph] is used as a means of correspondence, and as a valuable, and in
many cases an indispensable, substitute for the postal facilities; and the
communication is made, not because the party desires to put the operator in
possession of facts, but because transmission without it is impossible.... The
reasons of a public nature for maintaining the secrecy of telegraphic
communication are the same with those which protect correspondence by mail.
237. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657 (1980) (emphasis added)
[S]urely the Government may not exceed the scope of the private search unless it
has the right to make an independent search. In these cases, the private party had
not actually viewed the films.... The projection of the films was a significant
expansion of the search that had been conducted previously by a private party and
therefore must be characterized as a separate search.
Id.; United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984) (The agent's viewing of what a private
party had freely made available for his inspection did not violate the Fourth Amendment.... [T]he
removal of the plastic bags from the tube and the agent's visual inspection of their contents enabled
the agent to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the private search.)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the use of electronic communications services and other forms of
electronic commerce.238
C. An Appropriate StandardRequires that Government Requests for
Electronic Communications ParticularlyDescribe the Subject Matter or
Contents of the CommunicationsSought in Orderto Avoid
"IndiscriminateRummaging"
General requests for "all" electronic communications maintained in an
account of a particular ISP customer between certain periods of time, such
as those proposed in the guidelines,239 cut against the grain of American
jurisprudence's preference for narrowly tailored government requests for

238. See ExparteBrown, 72 Mo. 83, 94-95 (1880) (quashing overly broad subpoena issued
for telegrams, then a new and increasingly useful technology, and stating "[sluch an inquisition,
if tolerated, would destroy the usefulness of this most important and valuable mode of
communication by subjecting to exposure the private affairs of persons intrusting telegraph
companies with messages for transmission, to the prying curiosity of idle gossips, or the malice of
malignant mischief-makers"); Inviolabilityof Telegraphic Correspondence,18 A.L. REG. 65, 78
(Thomas M. Cooley et al. eds., 1879) ("Production of telegraphic messages defeats the policy of
the law which invites free communication, and to the extent that it may discourage correspondence,
it operates as a restraint upon industry and enterprise.").
239. See KERR, supranote 47, at app. E (requesting all "contents of electronic communications
not in "electronic storage" (i.e., electronic mail that has already been opened by the user) currently
held or maintained in the account associated with the address "[W]"... sent from or to the above
account during the period [X] through [Y] (inclusive). . . . The content of all electronic
communications in "electronic storage" for more than 180 days associated with the accounts
identified in Part A, that were placed or stored in [Z] computer systems in directories or files owned
or controlled by such accounts at any time up through and including the date of this subpoena.");
Id. at app. F (requesting all stored electronic mail of any kind sent to, from and through the e-mail
address [JDoe@isp.com], or associated with the user name "John Doe," or account holder [suspect].
Content and connection log files of all account activity from January 1, 2000, through March 31,
2000, by the user associated with the e-mail address [Jdoe@isp.com]).

A REVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS

written communications.24 0 The procedural protections of the
communications stored by or kept with non-target third parties under the
Privacy Protection Act and its implementing regulations 241 further support
a Congressional preference for narrowly tailored requests for electronic
communications stored by ISPs. Indeed, courts generally required
narrowly tailored subpoenas when the government sought telegrams from
private companies even though telegraph operators necessarily had to read

240. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906).
[Subpoena at issue did] not require the production of ... a limited number of
documents, but all understandings, contracts, or correspondence between the
MacAndrews & Forbes Company, and no less than six different companies, as
well as all reports made and accounts rendered by such companies from the date
of the organization of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, as well as all letters
received by that company since its organization from more than a dozen different
companies, situated in seven different states in the Union.
A general subpoena of this description is equally indefensible as a search
warrant would be if couched in similar terms.
*** *

Id. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390 (1920) (subpoenas involving "a
clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found" in the defendant's offices were
characterized as an "outrage"); Oklahoma Press Pub'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946)
("[The Fourth Amendment] guards against abuse.., by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth
in the things required to be 'particularly described' [in a subpoena] if also the inquiry is one the
demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant.");
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 486 (1965) ("The indiscriminate sweep of [a warrant for all
materials relating to the Communist Party] is constitutionally intolerable."); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (stating Fourth Amendment does not permit "a general,
exploratory rummaging"); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 62 (1974) (stating
Fourth Amendment does not permit "indiscriminate rummaging"); Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573,
583 (1980) ("[I]ndiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general
warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth
Amendment.")
241. See 28 C.F.R. § 59.1 (providing the Dep't of Justice "Guidelines on Methods" providing
"[g]enerally, when documentary materials are held by a disinterested third party, a subpoena,
administrative summons, or intrusive. The purpose of the guidelines set forth in this part is to assure
that federal officers and employees do not use search and seizure to obtain documentary materials
in the possession of disinterested third parties unless reliance on alternative means would
substantially jeopardize their availability.") (emphasis added).
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the contents of such communications before relaying them to the next leg
of the telegraph network.242
Technology offers a way to deal with minimization in the review of email and electronic *communications, producing even more effective
minimization than is available in the context of voice communications.
Whether law enforcement accesses electronic communications from a
provider while it is in storage incident to transmission or beyond, it may
be relatively easy for the service provider to perform the minimization.
The service provider can use screens or filters to select, from the electronic
communications to or from parties identified in the order, only those
containing certain key words or phrases that would be identical to those
used by monitors in the voice context. As the investigation proceeds and
law enforcement learns more about the patterns of the target, the disclosure
can become more discriminating.243
242. See, e.g., United States v. Babcock, 24 F. Cas. 908, 909 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (motion
to set aside subpoena denied because subpoena included detailed list of names of senders and
recipients of messages sought); United States v. Hunter, 15 F. 712, 714-15 (N.D. Miss. 1882)
(motion to set aside subpoena granted because subpoena did not specify subject matter or identities
of recipients of telegrams sought); Exparte Jaynes, 12 p. 117, 117 (1886).
The petitioner was served with subpoena duces tecum, requiring him to produce
telegraphic messages, but there was nothing to point his attention to any particular
message or messages; he was required to search for and produce all messages
from a number of persons to many other persons between certain specified dates.
The service of the subpoena was an evident search after testimony. The petitioner
was not bound to respond, and committed no contempt in failing to examine the
papers under his control, to ascertain if any such messages had not been sent or
received.
In re Storror, 63 F. 564, 567 (N.D. Cal. 1894) ("[T]he same rule which governs search warrants in
general [regarding the requirement of specificity] should govern in the case of telegraphic
messages."); Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
[W]e are of opinion that the resolution adopted by the commission, under which
its agents took possession of the telegraph companies' offices and examined
wholesale the thousands of private . . . was without authority of law . ...
Telegraph messages do not lose their privacy and become public property when
the sender communicates them confidentially to the telegraph company.
Id.
243. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 13
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[I]nvestigation does not justify a subpoena which encompasses documents
completely irrelevant to its scope, particularly because the government has acknowledged that
relevant documents can be isolated through key-word searching."). Further, should ISPs become
involved in the process of discerning which electronic communications are responsive to a narrowly
tailored request, there is little reason to be concerned that ISPs would be any less sensitive to
privacy concerns if they, and not the government, made the first attempt to cull relevant documents
responsive to a narrowly drawn request for documents. Indeed, when the federal government

A REVIEW OF LEGAL STANDARDS

The tide of legal and legislative precedents flows in the direction of
providing greater protections from government access to electronic
communications stored by ISPs, and toward requirements that requests for
stored electronic communications be narrowly tailored, specifying the
identities of the communicants, the subject matter of the communications,
and particular "key word" searches to be conducted.

subpoenaed telegrams from telegram service providers in the nineteenth century, the Court in
United States v. Hunter, 15 F. 712, 715 (N.D. Miss. 1882), assumed the telegram providers
themselves were competent to identify the documents sought by a narrowly-drawn subpoena. In
United States v. Hunter, 15 F. 712, 715 (N.D. Miss. 1882), the Court stated that:
The subpoena should describe the telegrams required to be produced.., either
naming the parties sending or receiving, if stated, and the subject-matter to which
they are supposed to relate; or, if the names are not known, then the subject-matter
and the time or periods between which they were sent or received. When such a
subpoena is served upon the person having the possession of the telegram, it is his
duty to appear before the grand jury or court and produce the telegram called for,
he has a right to submit it to the inspection of the court, who will determine
whether or not it should be produced.
* * * * It is objected by the district attorney that the witness is not competent to
judge as to what is pertinent and proper evidence, and therefore all the telegrams
should be submitted to the court, or someone else designated by the court. There
is force in the position; but the witness is the custodian of all the telegrams in his
office, and is presumed to be a man of ordinary sense and capable of
understanding the telegrams designated in the subpoena, either by the names of
the parties or the subject-matter, and although there may be cases in which, either
from the want of proper discernment upon the part of the witness, or a disposition
to screen the party sought to be charged, it is better that such testimony be lost
than that any improper disclosure of the correspondence between those
unconnected with the matter of inquiry should be made.

